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One of the most crucial factors that e-commerce protocols should address is a fair 
exchange. In this research, an advanced method of cryptography coupled with the pay 
per use technique is used. A new electronic commerce protocol for the exchange of 
commodities is introduced. The proposed new protocol guarantees both features while 
addressing the main drawbacks associated with other related protocols. The new 
suggested e-commerce protocol is composed of two stages: pre-exchange and exchange 
stages. When the suggested new protocol is analysed with scrupulous protocol analysis, 
it attains fair exchange and a secure method of payment. The suggested new e-
commerce protocol is more efficient than other related existing protocols. In this 
research “protocol prototype” and “model checking” is used for the purpose of 
authentication. The protocol prototype verifies that the suggested new protocol is 
executable when it's used in a real context. By experimental designs, this research 
shows the length of asymmetric keys as the biggest element that affects the efficiency 
of the protocol. When model-checking is applied in this protocol, the outcome indicates 
that the suggested protocol achieves the required features of fairness. Protocol 
extensions give those involved in the protocol the capacity to be resilient to failure. By 
using three methods of authentication, this research confirms that the new proposed 
protocol is well formulated. The work reported in this thesis first study the existing fair 
exchange protocols that solve the fairness problem. Then, propose more efficient 
protocol to solve the fairness problem. The original idea in this thesis is to reduce the 
communication overheads, risks and solve the bottleneck problems in the protocols that 
involve an online TTP.  The idea is to dividing the process to two phases, pre exchange 
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phase and exchange phase. The proposed protocol has the characteristics: three 
messages are required between all parties, the protocol guarantee strong fairness for 
both customer and merchant. The new protocol let the customer to be sure about the 
merchant‟s item before he send his item and let the merchant to be sure about the 
customer‟s item before he send his item, online disputes are resolved by a Financial 
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Due to the rapid growth of electronic commerce in recent years, many businesses are 
today conducted online.  In other words, more businesses than ever before are using the 
Internet to sell their commodities to people all over the world.  The internet provides 
them with a platform for selling their items to all kinds of people without the 
restrictions of geographical borders.   
Customer choice in buying goods and services has been greatly improved through by 
this growth in e-commerce, and for a variety of reasons, growing numbers of customers 
now opt to buy their items through the Internet.  Firstly, customers have the 
convenience of making purchases in the comfort of their homes without having to go 
shopping malls or having to suffer the hassle of traffic jams.  Secondly, customers have 
the opportunity to quickly compare the prices of various traders.  Thirdly, goods and 
services are delivered to the customer‟s home.  Lastly, customers are able to buy 
products at anytime from anywhere in the world.  
In traditional commerce, customers do not have to worry that they will be given the 
product they paid for.  This is because the customer goes to a shop, selects a product, 
pays for it and takes it away.  Customers also do not have to worry that their financial 
data will be revealed to a third party, as they make payment in cash.  In addition to the 
above points, customers can remain anonymous and avoid merchants being able to 
trace their buying habits through making their payments in cash.  In e-commerce, the 
factors mentioned above vis-à-vis traditional commerce can be major concern for 
customers. Through online payment, personal data and financial information that are 
not encrypted might be revealed to fraudsters.  There must be trust between the buyer 
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and the seller but in e-commerce, customers may be worried that dishonest dealers will 
send them the wrong product or not send it at all.  
Thus, there needs to be a system in place for ensuring that all data being sent is done so 
through secure means.  There is no doubt that e-commerce has made the exchange of 
goods and services easier but it also poses risks to both the customer and the merchant, 
including the issues of security, safeguarding users‟ privacy, trust and 
anonymity[112,113].  The main challenge lies in the exchange of the digital 
commodities between all tips engage  in the transaction.  This is because the transacting 
tips do not deal with each other and hence may not confident. 
An e-commerce transaction is initiated when a buyer accesses an Internet website 
through a remote computer.  The buyer then places an order for a particular product of 
his or her choice.  If they are assured that the right product will be delivered to them, 
they formalize the process by placing an order making an electronic payment.  It is 
assumed that the merchant will not disappear into thin air or submit the wrong product 
after acquiring the payment.  This is called fair exchange.  Fairness occurs when both 
parties honour their obligation, i.e. the consumer makes a full payment and the trader 
delivers the right commodity.  
Fair exchange addresses two main problems.  Firstly, it ensures that the transacting 
parties exchange their items fairly.  Secondly, it offers an automated online dispute 
resolution mechanism in case a problem arises between the parties.  The protocols of e-
commerce should be well formulated in order to avoid dishonest behaviour on the part 
of any party.  Zhou et al [1] have suggested certain terms which electronic commerce 
should fulfil, and they include the following: (1) The process should guarantee fair 
exchange; (2) The dispute resolution should be automated and available in case any 
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party misbehaves; (3) The process should guarantee that the products to be received by 
the buyer are the ordered products, are of the correct quantity, and are free from any 
damage; (4) The exchange process should involve a trusted third party (TTP); and (5) 
All the processes of the transaction should be completed, or no process should be 
completed. Fair exchange protocols are divided into two: the ones that involve the 
participation of a Trusted Third Party (TTP), and the ones that do not.  The TTP 
guarantees fair exchange of products between the transacting parties.  The protocols 
which use a TTP use the idea of submitting the product in parts. For instance, the 
customer transmits part of the payment while the merchant transmits part of the 
product.  The exchange process goes on until the complete product is traded.  
The use of the TTP in fair exchange protocols are contain three kinds: An inline TTP 
based protocol the first kind. The role of the TTP is to exchange the respective 
commodities.  In other words, each entity submits its product to TTP, and the TTP then 
delvers the digital commodity to the buyer and the payment to the merchant.  In this 
case, the TTP guarantees that fairness is achieved in the protocol.  The second type of 
protocol uses an online TTP.  The role of the online TTP is only to verify the items to 
be exchanged, and hence the participation of the trusted third party in this protocol is 
reduced.  The third kind is offline protocols.  In these protocols, the transacting entities 
trade their goods directly, and the TTP only participates to solve proplems; hence, its 
involvement in the protocol is minimized. 
Above, we have discussed the two kinds of fair exchange protocol (those that uses a 
TTP and those that do not). Their main aim is to guarantee the fair exchange of 
products for the transacting parties.  Protocols that do not use a TTP are much less 
effective because the process required to complete them is long; in order to obtain 
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fairness for the transacting entities, the protocols should have equal computational 
power.  On the other hand, the major limitation of protocols involve an inline trusted 
third party is the trusted third party can become the source of a bottleneck but it should 
always be present.  Also, the protocols cannot submit the products to the transacting 
parties if the TTP crashes.  
When we compare protocols that use an online TTP and the ones that involve the use of 
an inline TTP, we realise that they both have setbacks.  The difference is that in online 
TTP, the participation of the TTP is greatly reduced.  Generally speaking, in the offline 
protocols, the TTP is not use in the protocols unless there is a conflict between the 
transacting parties. 
According to Wang et al. [2], human shortcomings and the complex nature of  e-
systems make it inconceivable to suggest all situations and ensure accurate processing 
in all conditions, even in well formulated and implemented code.  Protocol formulators 
and participants (stakeholders) must generate ways of eliminating these elusive but 
ultimately dangerous shortcomings in order to improve control and to safeguard e-
commerce users.  Such steps are necessary in order to avoid incorrect processing or to 
thwart fraudulent users who might exploit these weaknesses. To guarantee correct 
processing in all situations, there is a need for a comprehensive analysis of the methods 
used in the transaction process.  When we consider the methods, model checking is the 







1.2. Motivations and research questions 
The most crucial feature of the e-commerce transaction process is fair exchange.  Over 
the last decade, several researches have been conducted in the field of fair exchange 
protocols.  Different protocols have been suggested for different situations vis-à-vis the 
fair exchange process.  The main disadvantage of all the protocols that involve the use 
of a TTP is that the TTP can become the source of a communication bottleneck, thus 
resulting in inefficiency in performance. The reason for this poor performance is that all 
the processes of the transaction pass through the TTP. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the current fair exchange protocols and address any 
limitations regarding fairness.  We will then suggest a more effective and efficient 
protocol that will handle and solve the fairness (this means that at the end of the 
protocol, either each party obtains the expected item from the other or no party obtains 
the expected item.  This means that party that behaves correctly does not suffer a 
disadvantage.  For example, both parties should receive the expected items and none do 
so) issue[26,112,113].  Our initial aim in this thesis is to resolve the bottleneck issue in 
the protocols that use an online TTP, and decrease the communication overheads and 
risks.  The second problem is how to confirm that the suggested e-commerce protocol 
fulfils all the necessary requirements, including fair exchange.  Hitherto, most 
researchers have used informal techniques, such as listing down certain possible 
situations where attacks from fraudulent users could occur, and then analysing ways of 




E-commerce transactions require fair exchange, and this thesis will suggest a new e-
commerce protocol that will guarantee fair exchange.  In addition, it will also state the 
properties that have to be fulfilled in the course of the suggested e-commerce protocol.   
This researcher has analysed the current fair exchange protocols in the literature and we 
have framed the main research questions as follows: 
 
1. How can we design an efficient fair exchange protocol based on an online 
TTP to solve the increase in communication overheads, risks and bottleneck 
problems (i.e. improve the overall usability of the protocol)? 
 
2. How can we enhance and increase the fairness property in the fair exchange 















1.3. Research Methodology 
In this research, we have selected a particular scientific research method in order to 
implement „constructive research‟.  The term „constructive‟ refers to the knowledge 
developed as a result of a new protocol, model, method, etc.  However, it is difficult to 
conduct a scientific research in a certain field effectively without sufficient knowledge 
of the field, and hence, there is a need to acquire meta-knowledge through research.  
This scientific research methodology is conducted through four stages.  The first stage 
deals with the research literature review, the second deals with the suggested protocol 
on which this research paper is based.  The third stage explains in detail the formal 
authentication of the proposed protocol, and the final one assesses the whole work. 
 
 Stage 1: Background and critical review. 
Conduct a critical review of the literature on e-commerce, fair exchange 
protocols, and classification of those protocols, and provide a standard criterion 
for fair exchange protocols.  Assess the fair exchange protocols in order to 
authenticate the concept of the suggested protocol. 
 
 Stage 2: The proposed protocol. 
Suggest a fair exchange protocol for digital and physical commodities.  Enhance 






 Stage 3: Formal verification of the proposed protocol. 
Identify the formal verification systems, particularly model checking, such as 
Failure Divergence Refinement, Symbolic Model Verifier and SPIN.  Make a 
comparison between the suggested protocol and the other fair exchange 
protocols in order to confirm their effectiveness. 
 
 Stage 4: Implementation and Evaluation. 
A prototype „proof of concept‟ or „proof of principle‟ is required to ensure that 
the new protocol is executable, viable and workable. 
 
 
1.4. Measure of Success 
The success of this research will be assessed as follows: 
 The research questions outlined at the beginning must be answered. 
 An analysis will be conducted to reveal the difference between our suggested 
protocol and other protocol types. 
 Formulating an effective online fair exchange protocol: various e-commerce 
protocols have already been designed.  This research will critically assess them 
and formulate a new protocol that will address some of their limitations.  Hence, 




 Specification of the effectiveness of the suggested protocol: the new protocol 
will be specified; we will indicate the number of messages required, and the 
subject matter of these messages will also be specified. 
 An automatic built-in dispute resolution mechanism: there is the possibility that 
conflicts between the transacting parties will emerge at one time or another.  
Such disputes will resolve in a judgment.  The new protocol is intended to 
decrease the number of disputed cases but we will also provide an automatic 
dispute resolution mechanism.  
 The protocol should ensure strong fairness for the transacting parties. 
 A proof of concept implementation: a prototype proof of concept is required to 
ensure that the new protocol is workable, viable and executable. 
 
   
 
1.5. Thesis Contribution 
This thesis has made a new contribution by formulating a fair and secure protocol for the 
exchange of digital commodities and payment.  The thesis has also introduced a trusted 
third party, FSP (Financial Service Provider) that participates in the exchange of the 
digital product between the transacting parties. This is a well formulated new protocol. The 
validity of the proposed protocol is authenticated to ensure that the protocol is correct, 
strong and fulfils all specifications. The introduction of a third party, FSP, has raised 
security issues which have been addressed sufficiently in order to ensure that the protocol 
is strong and free of error.  
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1. This research has achieved a new e-commerce protocol that insurer‟s fairness and 
customer anonymity for both parties involved in the transaction. Apart from the 
role of the customer and the merchant, this new protocol clearly stipulates the 
role of the trusted third party, FSP, in the exchange process. 
2.  Since customers usually use the symmetric encryption and decryption during 
the exchange process, they can reduce their computational overheads. 
3. In order to authenticate the suggested e-commerce protocol,  this research has 
used three different authentication methods: These methods are: protocol 
analysis, protocol prototype and model checking. In general, the new protocol 
discussed in this research is a well formulated and secure protocol that ensures 
fairness for the two parties involved in the transaction process.   
4. Only three messages are required to be exchanged between all parties. 
5. The protocol guarantees strong fairness for both customer and merchant. 
6. The new protocol let the customer to be sure about the merchant‟s item before 
he send his item and let the merchant to be sure about the customer‟s item 
before he send his item,  
7. Disputes are resolved automatically online by a Financial Service Provider 
(FSP). 








1.6. Thesis Structure 
  
The following is a brief outline of the remaining chapters of this thesis, together with a 
summary of their contents. 
 
 Chapter 2: E- Commerce  
In this chapter, an introduction to e-commerce is presented.  E-commerce advantages, 
disadvantages and limitations are discussed, and some important issues are raised (such 
as the security of e-commerce and e-payment). 
 
 Chapter 3: Fair exchange protocols  
What is the fairness and fair exchange protocols are discussed in this chapter.  Dispute 
resolution is also covered and some of its techniques are presented. In this chapter, we 
discuss some of the concepts behind the designs and characteristics of protocols.  Also, 
some of the cryptographic concepts are discussed. 
 
 Chapter 4: Our proposed protocol. 
This chapter discusses the concepts behind our protocol‟s design, details the rules of 
design and describes its properties; some general assumptions for the suggested 
protocol are also clarified.  The new protocol is then presented, studied and contrasted 





 Chapter 5: Formal verification. 
This discusses the formal authentication of systems, specifically model checking, in 
order to authenticate the fairness property; model checking will be used to model the 
protocol. 
 
 Chapter 6: Protocol Implementation 
A prototype proof of concept execution is formed using the Java programming 
language.  The design and execution of the prototype that executes the protocol is also 
discussed. 
 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work 
A summary of the work in this thesis is presented in this chapter, and the results are 





















 Advantages of E-commerce 
 Process of E-commerce Operations 
 E-Payment Systems 
 Characteristics of Electronic Payment Systems 
 E-Payment System Models 
 E-Commerce Security  
 E-commerce Trust  
 E-commerce Limitations 
 
 
In this chapter, an introduction to e-commerce is presented.  E-commerce 
advantages, disadvantages and limitations are discussed, and some 







 2.1 Electronic Commerce 
Electronic commerce, also called e-commerce or e-comm, can be known as the 
purchasing and selling of goods and services electronically over computer networks 
such as the Internet.  E-commerce has developed from technologies such as e-funds 
transfer, supply chain management, e-marketing, e-transaction processing, e-data 
interchange (EDI), inventory management systems, and automated data collection 
systems.  The World Wide Web is the main channel of transaction in e-commerce, 
although it may include other forms such as cell phones, e-mail and telephones.  
Basically, e-commerce is taken to be the sales part of e-business.  In addition to sales, it 
encompasses exchange of information in order to enhance the funding and payment 
forms of business transactions [3].  
The main goal of a customer is to acquire a product that is in the hands of a merchant, 
while the main goal of the merchant is to sell the product to the customer and obtain 
payment from that customer.  Although the services offered by the merchant to the 
customer, such as ease of transaction and after-sales service, are crucial, the main 
concern for the customer is ensuring the delivery of the product ordered.  Hence, the 
transacting parties exchange their items, which are a payment and a product, in a fair 
manner.  This means that, at the end of the exchange process, the transacting parties 
should have each other‟s items or none of them do.  This method of trading items fairly 







The following are the different kinds of e-commerce [3]: 
 Business-to-Consumer (B2C): an online transaction that is carried out between 
a business and individual consumers. 
 Business-to-Business (B2B): this refers to online businesses transacting with 
each other, such as suppliers selling to distributors. 
 Customerr-to-Business (C2B): this point to personals selling their products or 
services to companies. 
 Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C): this refers to a person-to-person transaction 
where individuals can buy and sell online directly to each other. 
 
 
Figure 1: Business-to-consumer [6] 
 
Figure 1 show an example of B2C e-commerce, where a merchant (business) and a 
customer (consumer) are transacting with one another.  However, the processes shown 
in Figure 1 can be applied to all four types of e-commerce, in that the customer first 
searches the web for a product, places an order and makes the payment, while on the 
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other hand the merchant sends the product and provides after-sales services.  Thus, all 
four types of e-commerce follow the same process during a transaction. 
 
 
2.1.1. E-commerce Advantages 
 Shopping from home: customers are able to purchase products from the 
comfort of their home, without the hassle of traffic jams and standing in queues, 
by just going online. 
 Shopping at any time: e-commerce has no time limit, as customers can 
purchase products at their leisure any time of the day or night.  This is also an 
important factor for merchants in e-commerce, as they can sell their products to 
customers at any time because their websites have no closing and opening time. 
 Cheaper prices: customers can buy cheaper and better-quality products through 
the Internet.  This is because e-commerce reduces the costs of running a 
business, unlike traditional commerce where more employees need to be 
engaged, leading to higher running costs.  
 Home delivery: e-commerce often provides free delivery to the customer‟s 
home, particularly to those who spend over a certain amount.  
 Online sales support: customers can access a big amount of information about 
the product on the e-commerce website, and hence make a well-informed 
choice.  
 Global reach: e-commerce enables merchants to reach the global market, as 
business activities are not restricted by geographical boundaries; merchants can 
sell their products in both the national and international market.  
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 The number of employees is reduced: most activities in e-commerce are 
automated and hence fewer employees are required to carry out the operations. 
 Instant delivery: if the customer purchases an e-product (like e-book or a 
movie) online, then it is electronically sent to the customer immediately through 
a link in the merchant‟s website (or by e-mail). 
 Shopping for all people: all kinds of people can purchase online products, even 
those who live in remote areas or have special needs, provided they have an 
Internet connection [4, 5]. 
 
 
2.1.2. E-commerce Disadvantages 
Despite the many advantages mentioned above, e-commerce is characterized by certain 
disadvantages, which can be summarized as follows. 
 
 Privacy and security: these two issues are very important to both parties 
involved in the transaction.  Customers are concerned about the security of their 
personal and financial information when they are purchasing items online.  On 
the other hand, merchants are worried about the security of their website 
because if it is not well protected from dishonest users, their reputation may be 
tarnished.   
 Delivery: sometimes, customers are kept waiting due to delays in the delivery of 
the expected items.  Other times, the wrong product might be sent to the 
customer, or in some cases no product at all is delivered, particularly if the 
merchant is fraudulent.  
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 Inspecting products: in traditional commerce, customers are able to inspect and 
feel the product but in e-commerce, consumers are not able to see the actual 
product.  Instead they are only shown a picture and a description of the product. 
 Social interaction: in traditional commerce, there is personal deal between the 
consumer and the merchant, while in e-commerce, the relationship is 
completely impersonal.  This is because in e-commerce most of the transactions 
are conducted by computers.  This is likely to create some social problems in 
the long run. 
 Returning products: returning an item and asking for a refund can be very 
troublesome and time consuming in e-commerce, particularly if the transacting 
parties live in different geographical areas [4,5]. 
 
 
2.1.3. E-commerce Limitations 
According to some writers, e-commerce limitations can be divided into technological 
and non-technological limitations [4, 5 and 7]. These limitations are reviewed in the 
following sections. 
 
2.1.3.1. The technological limitations 
Technological limitations refer to those that are inherent in the technology that is used 
in e-commerce.  The following are some of these limitations: 




•   Internet connections still remain expensive or out of reach for many users. 
• There is a lack of universally agreed upon standardized quality-measurement 
methodologies. 
 
2.1.3.2. The non-technological limitations 
Non-technological limitations refer to the risks and problems that users encounter when 
using e-commerce.  The following are some of these non-technological limitations[4]: 
 
• Security and privacy issues are the major concerns for online shoppers.  This 
is because the Internet is vulnerable to fraud and other abuses.   
• Most people do not have trust in e-commerce because they fear disclosing 
their personal and financial information for security concerns.  Others do not 
trust the technology itself and this reduces the number of potential online 
shoppers accordingly. 











2.1.4. Process of E-commerce Operations  
Before we classify e-commerce, we must understand the entire transaction process.  
There are three main stages involved in the e-commerce transaction process:  
 
 The searching stage: this is the stage where the customer or the merchant 
browses the Internet.  
 The ordering and payment stage: this is the stage where the customer places an 
order for a particular item, and then makes the necessary payment after an 
agreement has been reached. 
 The delivery stage: in this stage, the ordered products are delivered to the 
customer.   
The modern technology allows the first and second stages of the above transaction 
process to be done online.  The customer browses the Internet, chooses and/or makes 
enquiries about a product or service, and pays for it electronically.  
When we consider the third stage, only digital products and services can be sent 
electronically; physical commodities such as industrial and agricultural products cannot 
be sent online.  We can only send products that can be changed into digital form 
through the Internet.  The diagram below gives a clear illustration of the three main 
stages of the e-commerce operations, where the buyer first browses the Internet, selects 
an item, places an order and makes the payment (all through the Internet).  Then, the 
seller delivers the ordered product or services to the customer either physically or 





Figure 2: The process of e-commerce operations [7] 
 
Digital products that are sold and downloaded from the Internet have no international 
barriers.  Such products can be sent electronically from one nation to another without 
any restrictions.  This is because it is very hard to measure such a transaction and to 
place restrictions accordingly.  However, when delivering physical products, there are 
international barriers that cannot be waivered [7].  This is clearly illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 






2.2 Electronic Payment Systems 
In e-commerce, an electronic payment system is used instead of coin- and paper-based 
cash.  The system allows buyers to make electronic payments for the products that they 
buy online.  Other systems used by banks, such as bank draft and cheque, also have the 
same purpose.  Hence, e-commerce payment eliminates the need to carry money.  
However, safe and secure transaction is a critical characteristic of any e-commerce 
payment system in this Internet era, where online deception and fraud is a very 
common occurrence.  
The operations of electronic payment systems happen very quickly.  Credit cards are 
most often used for purchasing items over the Internet, however, credit card users are 
highly sceptical about the safety of their funds and the security of the Internet because 
of widespread Internet fraud and scams [8], which can result in financial losses for the 
buyer and the seller, and for the bank that is involved in the transaction.  Examples of 
older systems that use electronic methods are: the electronic clearing system (ECS), 
check transaction system, online credit card transaction system, etc.   
However, the current electronic payment systems are not perfect due to the higher 
fixed-transaction costs, Internet scams and the simultaneous participation of several 
parties in the payment process.  These systems have no standard compatibility, and lack 
user confidence and proper application plans.  Modern electronic payment systems 
should live up to the high expectations of users and merchants. 
The current e-payment systems can be categorized into: electronic cash and credit/debit 
systems [9] and the account-based and token-based systems [10].  Tokens and e-cash 
are similar to normal cash, in that they represent value but the credit/debit and account-
based systems do not embody value, rather a message to send value. 
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2.2.1 Features of Electronic Payment Systems 
The success or failure of an electronic payment system is determined by several factors 
or features.  These include trust, security, user friendliness, interpretability, traceability, 
etc.  Abrazhevich in [10] Gennadey Medvinsky and B. Clifford Neuman in [11] have 
divided these features into two features relating to the user, and features relating to 
technology. 
  However, we argue that, although informative, this distinction is a little simplistic as 
there is a degree of overlapping between technology and user accordingly we describe 
these features thus: 
 Applicability: the system should accept the user if he uses right procedure to 
purchase items or services. 
 Simple: the system should be user friendly.  People in remote areas of the world 
should be able to use it.  
 Security: this deals with the implementation of the value (money).  Creation, 
alteration and over-spending of that value must be safeguarded. 
 The integrity of the value and the mandate for the value should be deemed 
satisfactory on the part of the concerned users. 
 Reliability: the system should run smoothly and the probability of failure should 
be low.   
 Trust: the user should have confidence in the system, knowing that their finance 
and personal data will not be compromised.  
 Scalability: the system should function well even when the workload changes in 
size and volume.  
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 Convertibility: the currency or value should be convertible from one form to 
another.  
 Interoperability: this refers to the ability of the system to work with other 
systems.  
 Efficiency: micro-payments should be cost effective in the sense that they 
should not be inordinately expensive. 
 Anonymity: confidentiality should be guaranteed in order to protect the privacy 
of the user. 
 Traceability: the system should be able to rack the money in the system, such as 
who sent what and when it was sent, without compromising the anonymity of 
the user. 
 Authorization type: both offline and online transactions should be secure, and 














2.2.2 Electronic Payment System Models 
When purchasing goods or services online, the buyer sends the payment to the 
merchant electronically.  In the traditional system, both the consemer and the merchant 
physically exchange the payment and the product, and in this form of commerce, there 
is no participation of any third entity in the transaction.  
 However, for an electronic payment system, several models have been proposed by 
different organizations and researchers, and some of these systems are briefly discussed 
below.Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Markus Schneider classified e-payment systems into 
four kinds [11]: e-cash, cheque or credit card, and remittance and debit order-based 
systems.  In e-cash-based transactions, the customer withdraws his/her e-cash or e-
token from the bank where he/she holds an account and the bank debits that buyer‟s 
account by the value equal to the amount of that token.  The customer after that buys 
items using the e-cash or token.  After receiving the e-cash, the merchant deposits it in 
his/her own bank account.  The merchant‟s bank then submits an order to the 
customer‟s bank in order to transfer the money and deposit it in the merchant‟s account. 
 
Figure 4: Electronic cash-based payment model [11]. 
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There is no withdrawal for the user in the cheque and credit card payment system (level 
1 in the figure above).  The merchant merely deposits the cheque or credit card slip in 
his/her bank.  The buyer‟s bank then send the money into the seller‟s account. 
 
 
Figure 5: Cheque/credit card-based payment model[11] 
In the other two types of electronic payment systems, both the user and merchant 
instruct their respective banks to transfer the money. Terminologies such as „issuer‟ for 












2.3. E-Commerce Security 
The issue of security is a major factor in e-commerce.  As a result, most customers opt 
to purchase goods and services from well-secured websites and trusted merchants.  
Therefore, in order to protect the private and financial information of the customer and 
to motivate them to shop online, merchants must invest a great deal in protecting their 
systems from fraudulent access.  US$ 6.2 billion was spent on security around the 
world in 1999 but this reached $25 billion in 2002 [13].  This shows that merchants 
recognize the increasing security threats of e-commerce and are now spending huge 
sums to overcome them.  E-commerce systems are prone to fraud, misuse and failure 
[14], and the effects of these security threats on e-commerce impact on both transacting 
parties.  Some of these effects are outlined below. 
Firstly, both transacting parties can lose huge sums of money.  In 2000, established e-
commerce pages (such as eBay, Buy.com and tesco.com) were attacked, and these led 
to losses estimated at approximately $1.7 billion [13].  Secondly, classified data such as 
debit or credit card information are prone to theft.  A case in point is that the TK Maxx 
stores were attacked in 2007, and private information was stolen from 45.7 million 
payment cards (debit and credit) [15].  Thirdly, online shoppers will lose trust in e-
commerce if there is lack of security in the system; some may cease shopping online 
altogether.  Finally, unauthorized users might take advantage of the resources in the 
system.  
The above effects demonstrate the urgent need for a safe and secure e-commerce 
system.  If the e-commerce system is safe and secure, more customers will shop online, 
hence leading to significant increases in sales and profits for merchants.  E-commerce 
systems are threatened by two types of attack [13]; the first is non-technical.  This kind 
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of attack is carried out by people who work within the system.  They might reveal 
confidential information to unauthorized persons or carry out activities that 
compromise the security of the system.  The second type is technical; this refers to an 
attack on the infrastructure of the system, and it is performed by software.  Examples of 
technical attacks include computer viruses, worms and Trojan Horses [4]. 
In order to achieve secure e-commerce systems, three issues need to be addressed [8], 
and these are: 
1) Customer security 
If customers use unsecured software (such as Internet browsers) when buying 
goods and services over the Internet, they may be responsible for undermining 
the safety of e-commerce. 
 
2) Data transport security 
When customers use an e-commerce system, they make payments or send their 
private information online.  There is a need for a secure system in order to 
protect these private data and to prevent dishonest users from accessing them.  
The following are some of the methods that can be used to safeguard the 
privacy of these data. 
 
 Public key infrastructure (PKI): this consists of SK and PK   
encryption, digital signatures and certificates. 
 Secure socket layer (SSL) protocol [SSL] 




3) Merchant security 
It is crucial to secure the merchant‟s system, as it contains highly classified 
information (for both customers and merchants).  Consequently, failure to 
secure the merchant‟s system may result in customers losing trust and faith in 
the merchant.  
In summary, an e-commerce system is used to conduct the purchasing and selling of 
items (whether digital or not) between a customer and a merchant via the Internet.  
Therefore, the e-commerce system should be well secured in order to protect sensitive 
information (both the customer‟s and the merchant‟s) from unauthorized access.   
The customer‟s side should be well secured in order to protect the personal data and 
financial information of the customer.  On the other hand, the merchants‟ side should 
be secured in order to protect the customer‟s data and the product to be sent.  Also, the 
communication channel between the transacting parties should be well secured in order 
to protect the items being sent between the parties. 
The customer‟s side can be protected by using secured software.  The merchant‟s side 
can be protected by using a secured web server and a secured operating system for the 
network server.  Lastly, the communication channel can be protected by using strong 
security infrastructures and protocols such as SSL, SET and PKI.  Another security 
threat is the issue of protecting both of the transacting parties from each other.  For 







2.4. E-commerce Trust 
Building trust and credibility is an important factor in business.  The issue of trust is of 
particular importance in e-commerce because online shoppers have limited knowledge 
about the merchant and the merchant‟s ability to deliver the ordered goods.  Trust and 
security are considered to be the most crucial factors in the success of e-commerce 
[16]; most customers who are fearful of shopping online state that they lack trust in the 
merchants [17].  45% of agents interviewed in a survey of 60 agents at a US company 
stated that they avoid shopping regularly online Because of the loss of confidence in the 
system [18]. 
Increased customer confidence in online shopping can increase sales. If trust is 
established between the transacting parties, then each of them is likely to fulfil their 
obligations.  For example, if the customer has confidence in the merchant, he/she will 
make the payment in good time with the expectation that they will receive the ordered 
product in a speedy manner.  
Two kinds of trust in e-commerce exist; the trust in the technology used and the trust in 
the trading partner.  Technological trust can be achieved through the reliability of the 
system; unreliable technology can affect the trust of customers in the e-commerce 
system [20].  It is very difficult to establish trust with a partner but it is easy to lose, and 
this can lead to serious cost consequences [17].  
 
Trust is normally built over time through honesty and integrity.  In the case of e-
commerce, the customer must interact with the merchant over a period of time in order 
to develop trust and vice versa.  The same applies for the merchant because there are 
customers who are trusted by the merchant but there are others who are dishonest and 
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are untrustworthy.  Previous interactions between the parties play a significant role in 
building trust.  Good relationship with other people can also build trust, i.e., if a 
customer has a good reputation with a trusted merchant, then this customer is likely to 
recommend the merchant to other customers.  Generally, trust can be earned by having 
a good reputation. 
According to Srinivasan [21], there are five factors that promote trust between the 
transacting parties in e-commerce: 
1. Easy accessibility to the display and description of goods and services available 
in a merchant‟s website. 
2. Simple procedures of ordering items. 
3. Customers should receive order confirmation after placing an order. 
4. Customers should be able to track the items they have ordered. 
5. An offer of after-sales services to customers. 
The above factors are very significant part in construction the consumer confidence and 
trust in purchasing products from a merchant, particularly when the customer is 
interacting with the merchant for the first time.  After interacting with the merchant and 
gaining experience, the customer will be confident when buying items on subsequent 
occasions and may even recommend others to buy products from the merchant.  In 
general, customer confidence and trust can be established by past experience combined 
with other factors such as good reputation [4]. 
There are various ways of improving trust and confidence between the customer and 
the merchant in e-commerce.  For example, e-Bay [22] allows customers to make 
comments after purchasing a product from a merchant through a manual process.  
These remarks reflect the buyer‟s (customer‟s) opinion about the product sold by the 
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merchant, and can be viewed by anyone who visits an e-Bay website.  These comments 
will help merchants to improve their reputation and will encourage more customers to 
purchase goods from them. The notion of improving the level of trust used by e-Bay 
can be called a „trust profile‟ for a merchant, and the same can be done for customers.  
For example, a merchant can keep and view the trust profile of a customer when they 
are making purchases in order to identify their trustworthiness by looking at their past 
purchasing habits.  The trust profile is done manually and there is scope for automation, 
probably by using fair exchange protocol or some other system. Thus, trust between the 
transacting parties is a critical issue in e-commerce.  Confidence and trust in the partner 
involved in the transaction, whether customer or merchant, will either motivate or 
demotivate the user to participate in the e-commerce system.  As a result, it is vital for 
the success of e-commerce to formulate e-commerce protocols that can improve trust 
between the transacting parties. Regardless of fraudulent users (customers and 
merchants), e-commerce protocols should guarantee fair exchange of payments and 










The two parties involved in e-commerce transactions normally exchange items.  The 
items that are exchanged are a payment on the part of the customer and a product on the 
part of the merchant.  The objective of the customer is to acquire the ordered products, 
while the objective of the merchant is to acquire the correct payment.  This process of 
exchange is referred to as the fair exchange of goods.  
A general description of electronic commerce was presented in the introduction to this 
chapter, and the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of e-commerce were 
outlined.  The major threat facing e-commerce, which is security, was also discussed.  
It was shown that in order to achieve a secure e-commerce system, three aspects must 
be secured.  They are the software that is used by the customer, the channel of 
communication that is used to transmit and receive the data between the transacting 
parties, and lastly, the server on the merchant‟s side. It was also discussed in this 
chapter that trust of dealing in exchange items is critical to the expansion of e-
commerce. E-commerce users want to trust both the technology of the e-commerce 
system and the partner with whom the user will interact.  Trust in a partner is normally 
gradual and it is difficult to build but easy to lose.  Trust between the transacting 
partners can be built by using protocols that guarantee fair exchange of payments and 
products. Lastly, this chapter reviewed e-payment systems, in particular those that 
involve the use of a credit/debit card, by giving illustrations on how information is 
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 Fairness in Electronic Commerce 
 Overview of Fair Exchange Protocols  
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Definitions for fairness and for fair exchange protocols are presented in 










3.1. Definition of Fairness 
Fairness is a broad concept, employing various terminologies that are adaptable to 
different fields of application.  The term fairness, which has lately been introduced into 
e-commerce, refers to an impartial or unbiased exchange of items between the 
transacting parties in such a way that no one gains advantage.There are many types of 
fair exchange protocols exist,which formulated for to grantee fairness in e-commerce.  
Each of these protocols has a different idea of fairness, and hence it is quite difficult to 
compare or formally validate them, as there is a lack of any unified or standard formal 
definition for fairness [23]. 
Thus, the term fairness has a number of definitions; there are more than nine entries for 
the definition of the adjective „fair‟ in The Free Online Dictionary (by Farlex)[24].  
Accordingly, the concept of fairness is used in academic circles apparently in varying 
although distinct ways.  Basically two somewhat different linguistic definitions linked 
to the usage of the term fair in computer science:  
1. The first definition is characterized by conformity to generally recognized 
standards of propriety or morality. 
2. The second definition relates to the process of applying „the rules‟ equally to all 
concerned parties and items (this definition is different from the first).  The 
main goal of e-commerce is to provide a platform that enables technologies [25] 
to provide services (buying and selling goods) online in addition to performing 
other functions such as advertisement and maintenance. 
It can be inferred from these that the second definition has been adopted in e-
commerce.  The basic issue to be addressed in e-commerce relates to the fair exchange 
of goods between the transacting parties.  There have been formulations of different 
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kinds of fairness; however the problem is that their meanings have remained informal.  
Lack of formally universally accepted definitions of these terms will make it difficult to 
validate and compare fair exchange protocols. Hence, there is a need to formalize the 




3.1.1. Fairness in Electronic Commerce 
According to Asokan [26], a fair system refers to a system “that does not discriminate 
against a correctly behaving player.  As long as a player behaves correctly, a fair 
system must ensure that other players will not gain any advantage over the correctly 
behaving players.”  In a fair exchange scenario, the transacting parties, for example X 
and Y, follow a fair exchange process.  This process must not allow a situation whereby 
X can receive Y‟s items while Y cannot receive X‟s items.  A process that involves a 
fair exchange protocol between X and Y must fulfil three conditions: 
1. Effectiveness: if the protocol is executed correctly and the parties X and Y 
honour their commitment, then both parties will have each other‟s items. 
2. Timeliness: the protocol will be finally executed [112,113]. 
3. Fairness: there are two types of fairness: 
 Strong fairness: this means that at the end of the protocol, either each 
party obtains the expected item from the other or no party obtains the 
expected item.  This means that party that behaves correctly does not 
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suffer a disadvantage.  For example, both parties should receive the 
expected items or none do so. 
 weak fairness: this means that at the end of the exchange, either strong 
fairness is achieved, or the correctly behaving party that does not receive 
the expected item can prove to a third party that Y has received (or still 
can receive) X‟s item without any more involvement from X (regardless 
of whether Y behaves correctly or not), and vice versa.  Although strong 
fairness is desirable, sometimes it is very expensive or impossible to 
guarantee, and that is why the two forms of fairness exist. 
Weak fairness is important because it provides a platform for a dispute resolution; the 
disadvantaged party can seek a dispute resolution outside the system.  The party that 
suffered a disadvantage can achieve strong fairness by using an external dispute 
resolution system, such as a court of law, provided it can prove that it was treated 
unfairly.  A number of fair exchange protocols ensure strong fairness by using a trusted 
third party (TTP).  Most of these protocols, apart from Burk and Pfitzmann [27] refer to 











3.2. Overview of fair exchange protocols 
The main reason why we require protocols in e-commerce is to manage the transaction 
between the buyer and the seller.  In order to motivate potential customers into 
engaging in e-commerce, protocols should be well formulated and secured.  These 
protocols will protect both parties from fraudulent users and subsequently promote the 
growth of e-commerce.  There are protocols which are designed to guarantee fairness 
between the customer and the merchant so that neither party gains advantage over the 
other [112,113].  These protocols are known as fair exchange protocols.  
A trusted third party (TTP) is a nonpartisan party (entity) or an impartial intermediary 
used in fair exchange protocols, whose role is to ensure that each party receives the 
item it expects, or none do.  It is assumed that the TTP is neutral, available and trusted 
by all groups.  Sometimes, more than one TTP might be involved in a transaction.  
Accordingly, the TTP carries out all or some of the roles shown below [28,112,113]: 
 Ensures fair exchange of items. 
 Acts as an agent of delivery, for example, gives items to the concerned parties. 
 Acts as a reliable and trusted agent for the transacting parties. 
 Solves problems between the parties in case of disputes. 
 Validates items and awards certificates. 
Fair exchange protocols ensure that the two parties involved in the transaction 
exchange their items fairly.  Often transactions occur between parties who are not 
familiar with one another and (or) may not trust one another.  To facilitate fair 
exchange and protect both parties, fair exchange protocols have been designed, and 
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their objective is to ensure that, at the end of the exchange, both parties receive each 
other‟s items, or none do. 
The current fair exchange protocols may be classified into two main types, depending 
on the use of the TTP.  The protocols that do not involve the use of a TTP are the first 
type, while the protocols that do involve the use of a TTP form the second type [29, 30, 
and 31]. The protocols that involve the use of the TTP can be divided into three sub-
types, which are as follows [32]: 
 Inline protocols depend on a trusted third party.  
 Offline protocols depend on a trusted third party. 
 Online protocols depend on a trusted third party [112,113]. 
  
 3.2.1. Inline protocols depend on a trusted third party 
Such as in [27, 33, 34], the TTP is for sending the traded commodities to the respective 
parties.  This means that the TTP receives the items from each party, authenticates them 
and delivers them to the respective parties.  For example, if there is a customer and a 
merchant in a transaction, then the two parties will exchange items such as a digital 
product (held by the merchant) and a payment (held by the customer). The protocol is 
then carried out in the following manner.  Both the customer and the merchant send 
their items to the TTP.   
The customer sends the payment while the merchant delivers the digital product.  Then, 
the TTP authenticates the received items and, after approving them, delivers the 
payment to the merchant and the digital product to the customer [112,113].   
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Figure 6 illustrates a model of the fair exchange protocols that involve an inline TTP.  
We see in this protocol that the TTP is involved actively in the exchange of items 
between the transacting parties. Involving the TTP in this type of protocol guarantees 
that the parties involved in the transaction exchange their items fairly. Direct contact 










Figure 6: Inline TTP-based fair exchange model 
 
The protocols that use inline TTP guarantee fairness for all parties involved in the 
transaction because the TTP delivers the respective items to the parties, however, they 
have some drawbacks.   Firstly, it is expensive to run inline TTP protocols because they 
require the availability of the TTP during the execution of the protocol, which lead to 
extra costs [39].  Secondly, in this type of protocol, the TTP may become the source of 
a communication bottleneck, hence leading to performance problems [35, 36, 37 and 
38].  This is because the items to be exchanged must pass through the TTP.  Thirdly, in 
case there is a crash in the TTP, the protocol will not be carried out and the parties will 
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not be able to receive the items that they expect. The actual real life example of this 
kind of protocols is PayPal.   
Lastly, in case of any attack, the TTP will be the main target [36,112,113].  Examples 




 3.2.2. Offline protocols depend on a trusted third party 
Such as in [33, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42], the transacting parties exchange their commodities 
directly without the use of the TTP unless a problem occurs.  This type of protocol is 
also known as in the literature „optimistic fair exchange.  
 The example below explains how the optimistic fair exchange protocols work if the 
commodities to be traded between the transacting parties are a payment and a digital 
product.  The two parties directly trade their items, and in case of any problem, the TTP 
will be involved to mediate between the parties.  Figure 7 illustrates a model of a fair 










Figure 7: Offline TTP-based fair exchange model 
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In the optimistic fair exchange protocols, the role of the inline TTP is greatly decreased 
because of the minimal use of the TTP (it is not involved in every exchange) [112,113].   




 3.2.3. Online protocols depend on a trusted third party. 
Such as in [43, 44, 45 and 46], these involve less participation on the part of the TTP.  
In such protocols, the TTP is not used during the protocol run for delivering the parties‟ 
items; rather, it is for verifying an item, and generating and/or storing proof of 
exchange of items [38].  The example below illustrates the use of an online TTP in 















If the commodities to be traded between the transacting parties are a digital product and 
a payment, the customer starts the exchange, and when the payment is received by the 
merchant from the customer, the merchant then verifies it with the TTP (a bank for 
example) before sending the digital product to the customer.  The TTP must therefore 
be online for the exchange process to be completed, and should be contacted in case 
there is any dispute.  Figure 8, showing a model of a fair exchange protocol that is 
based on an online TTP, reveal that there is minimal involvement on the part of the 
TTP in this type of protocol, but the TTP must be available throughout the exchange 
process.  This can be viewed as a drawback because the TTP may become the source of 

















 The Zhang et al. Protocol  
Zhang et al. [43] suggested a fair exchange protocol that uses an online TTP.  This 
protocol is for the exchange of items such as a physical product and a payment.  
 
 
Figure 9: The process of Zhang et al.‟s protocol [43] 
The customer makes online payment (i.e. via the protocol messages) to the merchant, 
whereas a delivery agent is used to deliver the product to the customer, which means 
that the product is not transmitted electronically.  The protocol is based on the theory of 
cross-validation [76].  In this protocol, the customer first begins the process by ordering 
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a product from the merchant.  The merchant then sends the invoice to the customer.  
Once the customer is happy with the invoice, they then firstly send a coded payment to 
the merchant and secondly to the TTP (the bank).  
It is taken for granted that the merchant can download the coded payment (that was sent 
by the customer to the TTP) from the TTP (the bank).  The merchant then makes a 
comparison of the two encrypted payments (i.e. the one received from the customer and 
the one downloaded from the TTP).  If the merchant is satisfied that the encrypted 
messages compare, it means that the payment is valid.  The merchant then delivers the 
product to the delivery agent after confirming the coded payment.  The customer then 
takes the product from the delivery agent and, after confirming that the right product 
has been sent, they send the decryption key to the merchant who will then decode the 
coded payment [112,113]. 
We observe a limitation in the fairness of this protocol.  If the merchant claims that he 
received an incorrect decryption key for the payment token or did not receive one at all, 
the third party (bank) will provide the K1
-1
 (decrypts the contents of the payment) after 
asking the customer if he is satisfied.  The third party (bank) will also provide the K1
-1
 
if the customer is not traceable.  However, if the customer is not intentionally 
untraceable and also does not have the required product, then by having the K1
-1
 from 
the third party, the merchant certainly has an advantage.  The fairness of the protocol is 
based on the theory of cross-validation, which proceeds via a number of process steps 
that take into account the accuracy of the commodity.  According to this protocol, the 
product information is not revealed to either the third party or the merchant in order to 
safeguard the customer‟s anonymity.  A secured channel is proposed in this protocol to 
ensure confidentiality.  Also, timeliness is a strong property in this protocol [112,113]. 
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 The Devane et al. Protocol  
Devane et al. [44] suggested a fair exchange protocol that can be used for buying items 
online.  This protocol enforces the fair exchange of a payment from a customer and a 
digital product from a merchant.  However, in this protocol, a bank acts as an online 
TTP in which both the customer and the merchant have accounts [112,113]. 
 
 
Figure 10: The process of the Devane et al. protocol [44.] 
 
In the Devane et al. protocol, there are seven messages that are exchanged by the 
transacting parties and the TTP (which is the bank) during the exchange phase.  The 
protocol begins by the customer sending the first message with a signed purchase 
request.  Upon receiving the first message, the merchant authenticates it and, after 
approval, submits the second message with a signed invoice together with the 
encrypted digital product to the customer.  After receiving the second message, the 
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customer verifies and authenticates the signed invoice and, if satisfied, sends the third 
message to the merchant, which includes a signed payment.   
After receiving the third message, the merchant verifies and authenticates it and, if 
satisfied, sends the fourth message to the bank with the decryption key for the digital 
product together with the third message that was sent by the customer and signed by the 
merchant (i.e. the merchant signs the signed payment by the customer and sends it to 
the bank).  Upon receiving the fourth message, the bank authenticates it and, if it is 
approved, the bank then submits the fifth message to the merchant with the bank‟s 
signature on the signed payment together with the decryption key.  After receiving the 
fifth message, the merchant then forwards it to the customer.  After receiving the sixth 
message, the customer receives the decryption key and decrypts the encrypted digital 
product that was delivered in the second message.  The customer submits the seventh 
message to the bank after approving that the decrypted digital product is the one that 
was described in the first message.   
The seventh message contains the customer‟s approval of the digital product.  Upon 
receiving the seventh message, the bank then finalizes the transaction by deducting the 
payment from the customer‟s account and transferring it to the merchant‟s account.  
We observe a limitation in the fairness of this protocol; the merchant will receive the 
payment only after the customer has confirmed the items but there is no guarantee that 
the customer will make the payment after acquiring the items.  The customer is 
certainly in an advantageous position.  A secured channel is proposed to ensure 
confidentiality.  Also, timeliness is a strong property in this protocol.  The protocol 




 The Q. Zhang et al. Protocol 
 Q. Zhang et al. [45] created a protocol that gives users a centric online m-payment 
solution.  The protocol guarantees fair exchange and anonymity for the customer. 
 
 
Figure 11: Principal participants in the Q. Zhang et al. protocol [45] 
 
 
There are seven main entities involved in this protocol and there are twelve messages 
exchanged in this protocol with the participation of a trusted third party. And it is depending 
on the following assumptions: to begin with, the customer buys a pre-paid SIM card from a 
mobile phone operator without exposing the personal details.  The mobile operator has a 
Commit buffer along the buyer‟s invoice account, and keeps a currency account with an 
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authorized dealer. A PK/ SK pair is then created by an online TTP.  All data regarding 
delivery addressees are saved by the customer in the cell phone.  A fingerprint sensor is 
embedded within the device, and the customer then saves the fingerprint data inside the 
SIM card.  In order to exchange data, the mobile phone is linked to the payment Applet 
through a shared symmetric encryption session key. 
The customer initiates the protocol by accessing the e-commerce website to choose a 
commodity, and then he/she starts the process of transaction by signing in, using a mobile 
phone number.  He/she then fill in the required data in the invoice and post it to the 
merchant.  The data to be filled in include: the total amount payable, the identity of the 
merchant, the agreed price of the commodity, the quantity, the product identity, and the 
public key of the merchant.  When the mobile phone receives the invoice from the 
merchant, the biometric data is extracted and transmitted to the Bio-Applet in the SIM card 
in order to establish the authenticity of the owner of the device.  
Using Message 2 and the subsequent messages, the Bio-Applet then transmits the matching 
results to the mobile phone.  The messages exchanged between the transacting parties are 
encoded with a session key to save the private details of the parties.  If the results do not 
match, then the mobile phone operator terminates the protocol.  On the other hand, if the 
results match, the mobile phone operator posts the payment request, the invoice, the seller‟s 
PK and the TTP‟s PK (encoded with a tsk) to the payment Applet.  When the payment 
Applet receives the above requests, it posts the payment the buy command signed by the 
consumer and the consumer‟s PK.  All the data are encoded with the seller‟s PK for 
security reasons.  The mobile phone then transmits the same message to the merchant 
through Message 6.  
By using a mobile phone, the payment Applet posts Messages 7 and 8, which contain the 
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payment token (encoded by K, and K1), K2 and the PK of the payment Applet (encoded by 
the TTP‟s public key).  After the trusted third party receives M8, it decodes it in order to 
extract the payment token, and then posts it to the mobile phone operator.  The mobile 
operator then approves the transfer of the payment from the buyer‟s account to the Commit 
buffer.  In case the insufficient credit in the customer‟s account, the mobile operator 
requests the customer to „top up‟.  If the payment is successfully deducted from the buyer‟s 
account, the payment is transferred into Commit buffer.  
In the final stage, the merchant posts (to the mobile phone) evidence of approval and terms 
and conditions regarding the process of the transaction through a signed buy requst, which 
is countersigned by the payment Applet. The seller then sends the commodity to the 
customer. The payment Applet then transmits [K2, MApub] in order to decode the payment 
token to the seller.  The seller lastly sends the payment token to the mobile phone operator.  
Financial institutions such as banks are not involved in this protocol.  For protect the safety 
and personality of the parties of the transaction, the protocol requires all sensitive 
information to be saved in the SIM card.  The SIM card runs the whole system of creating 
keys, encoding, decoding and issuance.  The protocol guarantees the safety and privacy of 
the participants by using secure channels.   
It also uses digital signatures through the senders‟ private keys in order to ensure that no 
party disowns a request or any feedback.  Issues regarding the anonymity of the customer 
are satisfactorily addressed because the customer‟s personal data are not registered when 
he/she purchases the card.  Neither the mobile phone operator nor the TTP are aware of the 
product information.   
According to the designers of the protocol, problems that arise during the exchange are 
automatically resolved without the need for manual intervention, hence ensuring fairness for 
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all parties.  The protocol also has a mechanism in place that prevents any false allegation 
from either party.  For example Message 10 has to be signed by the MA(The Merchant‟s 
Application)in order to counter any false claims by the merchant that he/she did not accept the 
terms and conditions. On the other hand, the TTP tells the customer to offer proof and 
reveal the delivery cabinet history in case there is the false allegation that he/she has not 
received the requested item.   
Although the protocol ensures fairness to a higher degree, there is still a weakness.  For 
example, consider a scenario where the merchant alleges that he/she never received the 
decoding key for the payment token or received an incorrect one.  In this situation, the TTP 
begins an extended protocol by first inquiring the consumer is happy with the product.   If 
the consumer is happy, then the trusted third part transfer  K1to the merchant.  Likewise, if 
the customer vanishes without a trace, the TTP will also give the K1 to the merchant.  
Fairness will be become an issue if the customer has not acquired the item and cannot be 
traced due to unavoidable circumstance; then, the TTP provides the K1 to the merchant.  In 
this case, the merchant will be in a position of unfair advantage, hence creating a fairness 
issue. 
We can see that this protocol has weaknesses in terms of fairness.  This issue of fairness can 
arise when the merchant appeal aslo the consumer able falsely claim that the seller has not 
posted the items; the TTP must then request the seller to present the the history of delivery 
cabinet and submit proof.  
There are other limitations in terms of the fairness of this protocol.  For example, if the 
merchant makes an allegation that he/she received an incorrect decoding key for the 
payment token (or never received it), then, according to the  extended protocol, the TTP will 
issue the K1 after gaining the customer‟s consent.  If the customer is untraceable, the TTP 
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will also issue the K1 to the merchant.  Consider a scenario where the customer is not 
traceable due to unavoidable circumstance and also has not yet received the requested item, 
and then by the acquiring K1 from the TTP, the merchant will definitely be in a position of 
unfair advantage.  
 
 The Zhou and Gollmann Protocol  
Zhou and Gollmann proposed a non-repudiation protocol that uses an online TTP [46].  The 
objective of this protocol is to minimize the role of the TTP, to provide the originator and 
the intended recipient with evidence both during and after the execution of the protocol 
(without any party having an unfair advantage), and to divide the message M into two parts: 
a commitment C and a key k.  The commitment is transmitted from the originator A to the 
recipient B, and then the key is lodged with the TTP.  Both parties must acquire the 
confirmed key from the TTP as part of the non-repudiation proof needed in resolving a 





Figure 12: Zhou and Gollmann‟s protocol [46] 
 
During the protocol, if an invalid message is received or if an awaited message does not 
arrive, the prospective recipient terminates the protocol.  In such a case, the following 
proofs are revealed: proof of origin, evidence of delivery, evidence of submission, and 
evidence of confirmation.  The protocol is outlined as follows: the message to be sent 
consists of two parts, where one is the encrypted text C and the other is the key k.  The 
sender A sends his digital signature and the encrypted text C to the intended recipient B.   
A begins the protocol by transmitting the cipher, using the session key k of the message he 
needs to transmit to B, a tag that marks the protocol session, a time-out value before which 
the session key should be sent to the TTP (and after which it can be consulted), as well as 
the signed non-repudiation of origin evidence for the ciphered message.  A suggests a 
consultation time-out and if B agrees, he transmits his signed non-repudiation of receipt 
evidence for the ciphered message.  After receiving it, A then transmits to the TTP a signed 
copy of the session key.  The TTP only receives one submission from a party in the course 
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of a protocol session.  The TTP then confirms the validity of A‟s signature and whether the 
time-out is exceeded or not.  After the time-out, B may obtain the session key and the non-
repudiation of origin evidence for this session key issued by the TTP.  This evidence is 
required when making a full non-repudiation of origin evidence for the message that A 
submits to him.  Similarly, A completes the non-repudiation of receipt evidence for the 
message by consulting with the TTP.  The two parties, A and B, will then request the 
session key and the related evidence for this key from the TTP.  
For B, the proof or evidence is an indication of origin, and for A, the evidence proves that B 
can access the key.  Both parties can access, at the right time, a read-only public directory 
controlled by the TTP.  If the gathered evidence cannot be obtained by one party, that party 
will lose any potential dispute on the issue.  In this case, the role of the TTP is minimized 
by obviating the obligation to acquire the data (controlled by the TTP) on the parties.  A 
resilient communication channel between the TTP and the parties is necessary for the 
proper functioning of the protocol.  If the channels of communication between the TTP and 
respectively A and B are resilient, the protocol is fairly strong and upholds the timeliness 
feature. 
In a fair non-repudiation protocol, the execution of the protocol should ensure that the Non-
Repudiation of Delivery Token (NRDT) and the Non-Repudiation of Origin Token 
(NROT) are accessible to both the originator and the intended recipient, respectively.  In 
addition, the protocol should be fail-safe.  In other words, an incomplete execution of the 
protocol will not lead to a scenario where the NRDT is accessible to the originator but the 
NROT is not accessible to the intended recipient, or vice versa. 
According to the definition of fairness, the protocol is not fair.  This is because if B gives up 
after B finishes the first step, B does not know the subject matter of the message, but he 
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receives the Non-Repudiation of Delivery Token.  Besides, the protocol is designed to 
transport more messages when running and it includes C in the evidence, which increases 
the amount of data transport.  The correctness of the product property is not considered in 
this protocol.  Also, the protocol does not ensure the customer‟s anonymity, as it starts with 
a message sent by A, which discloses the customer‟s true identity.  A secured channel is 
proposed to ensure confidentiality; also, timeliness is a strong property in this protocol 





































7 + physical 
delivery and 
collection 
Medium High 1 Yes 
Payment and a 
Product (digital or 
physical) 
Zhang et al. 
Strong 7 Medium High 1 Yes 







5 Medium High 3 Yes 
Provide the originator 
and the intended 
recipient with 
evidence after an 
execution 
Zhou et al. 
Strong 
 
12 Medium High 1 Yes 
Payment and digital 
product 
Q. Zhang et 
al. 
Table 1: Comparison of fair exchange protocols [4]. 
 
 
3.2.4. Protocols do not use a trusted third party  
In these, the two parties involved in the transaction exchange their items without the 
involvement of a TTP. The gradual exchange protocols [47, 48] can be used when the 
commodities to be exchanged can be equitably partitioned into a number of parts.  A 
gradual exchange protocol is based on the principle of having several rounds to 
complete the process of exchanging items between the transacting parties [112,113].  
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The parties each exchange an item in every round and the number of rounds is 
equivalent to the number of parts into which the commodities are divided.  The process 
of exchanging commodities continues until the transaction is completed and each party 
has received what it expects.  In each round, both the customer and the merchant send 
part of their commodity and also receive part of the other party‟s commodity (see 
Figure 14).The number of parts delivered to each party is almost the same at any given 
time [38].     
 
 
               
Party A Party B
Round 1
Party A Party B
Round n
  
Figure 13: Gradual exchange protocols. 
 
The major drawback of the gradual exchange protocols is that several rounds are 
needed to complete the exchange process.  If there many rounds to be made, a number 
of communication steps are required, which can overload the communication channel 
used by the two parties?  It is actually taken for granted that the items to be traded 
between the transacting parties have the same size [32].  As a result, this type of 
protocol does not support items of different sizes.  Gradual exchange protocols lack the 
59 
 
involvement of a TTP, which can be problematic, as it is impossible to guarantee 
fairness for both parties without a TTP who can mediate and solve problems [49].  
The following scenario explains the reason why gradual exchange protocols do not 
ensure fairness.  In stage one of the exchanges; side X submits the first part of his 
product to M. In stage two, M submits his items  to X.  Thus, the process of exchanging 
parts of the items continues.  If X delivers its last part of the item to M, but M vanishes 
without sending the final part to X, then M will have the complete items of X while X 
still wait the last part of items of M. Therefore, there is a likelihood that one of the 
parties will suffer from an unfair dealing during the fair exchange protocol [49]. The 
following is an explanation of parties interchange money for a digital item and no use 
of the trusted third party [50]. A small amount of payment is sent by a buyer to a seller, 
and in return the buyer receives a small part of the digital product from the merchant.  
This process of exchanging items continuous until each party receives all the items.  
This means that the merchant receives all of the payment while the customer receives 
the complete digital product. In this scenario, there is the likelihood that after receiving 
the final part of the payment, the merchant may not honour the commitment of 
delivering the final part of the digital product.  Therefore, fairness has not been 
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Strong 4 High Low Offline Yes 
Two digital 
documents 
Zhang et al 
Strong 7 Medium High Online Yes 
Payment and 
digital product 
Devane et al 






Ray et al 
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Payment and 
digital product 
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3.3. Dispute resolution 
Sometimes disputes arise between the parties involved in a transaction.  For example, a 
customer may receive from a merchant a product that is different from the one they 
expected (or the product may have a fault).  There is a high probability of a dispute 
occurring in an online purchase between the seller and the buyer, as they do not trust 
each other and the customer is not in a position to physically see and try the product. 
Dispute resolution formally occurs in a court of law.  However, there are some options 
for dispute resolution without resorting to a court of law, and they are known as 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); mediation and arbitration are models of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution.Online dispute resolutions are crucial in e-commerce as 
the merchants and customers may be in different geographical locations and hence 
operating under different legal systems.  When a disagreement is resolved online, it is 
62 
 
define as Online Dispute Resolution (ODR), and there are many methods used in ODR 
[52, 53]: 
Adjudication  
Adjudication refers to presence indifferent TP who gathers data from the parties 




Evaluation is similar to adjudication but the decision reached by the indifferent TP is 
not binding, rather a recommendation. 
 
Mediocrity 
Mediocrity refers to having a TP who assists the parties involved in a dispute to reach 




Auto parley for solve disputes that are concerned with pecuniary issues. Depend on the 
principle of Presence blind tenders from the parties, who offer their propositions to 
solve the problem.  Each party‟s offer is hidden from the other and at last, software 








A pseudo judgment is depending on Presence jurors who offer their services voluntarily 
and who make a decision on a disputed case using an online site platform.The 
conclusion took by the jurors is not bound. 
  
Claim support 
Claim support is a device that assists the individual who initiates a dispute.  Some of 
these devices include interacting format that the person must finished.  These devices 
provide counsel and detail like situation that have been helped by the device. 
 
Credit Card Charge Back 
In this technique, the credit card issuer‟s act as a TP between the two parties involved 
in a transaction.  The credit card issuer assesses the dispute and if the buyer‟s complaint 
is acceptable, it issues the buyer‟s value back.  
Although the above techniques are done online, they are not fully automated, and hence 
they have to be performed manually.  
There are two kinds of fair exchange protocol that contain dispute resolution [16].  The 
first type offers the dispute resolution mechanism during the execution phase, while the 
second type does not contain any dispute resolution steps during the execution.  
Protocols that contain dispute resolution during the execution phase have a mechanism 
that guarantees a resolution should there be a problem.  In these protocols, a TTP 
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receives a complaint from the disadvantaged party and resolves the dispute fairly.  
Some examples of this kind of protocol are [33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44]. 
Protocols that do not have a dispute resolution during the execution phase are based on 
gathering strong evidence to be used in the resolution of a problem.  These proofs are 
presented after the fair exchange protocol is executed, and the resolution can be made 
through an ODR mechanism or in a court of law.  The gathered evidence will help in 
resolving a dispute between the parties; examples of this type are [54, 55].  
 In order to use an ODR technique in fair exchange protocols, the protocol should offer 
a means of storing the evidence so that it can then be used in the ODR technique.  This 
method of resolving problems (using ODR techniques) is called an „after the fact‟ 
solution [35], in which the transacting parties may vanish.  In this case, the dispute 
resolution should be part of the execution of the fair exchange protocol, not after the 
execution of the protocol has been completed.  In order to achieve this, there should be 
a means through which disputes can be solved without interference (with the use of the 
trusted third party) before the execution of the protocol has been completed. 
There is no doubt that the protocols that have dispute resolution over the enforcement 
phase of the protocol are better than the protocols that do not; this is because the 
transacting parties are often in different geographical locations, and it will be difficult 
to go to a court of law in the other party‟s country.  In addition, one party may vanish 
without trace before the process of exchange is completed.  Therefore, the first type of 
protocols (those that involve dispute resolution in the execution phase) is better suited 
to e-commerce, as it is difficult to resolve a dispute after the execution of the fair 




The need for a dispute resolution mechanism can be reduced by finding a way of 
avoiding the possibility of a dispute arising in the first place.  This means that before 
the parties exchange their items, every part should check that the product they will get 
is the correct one.  If the possibility of a dispute arising is reduced, the number of 
messages required for the resolution of the dispute will also be reduced.   
 
3.4. Protocol Design 
E-commerce systems usually use electronic payment systems.  The effective and 
successful implementation of these electronic systems is mainly reliant on the protocols 
used.  In turn, the reliability of the protocols, in terms of being secure and sound, 
depends upon their design.  A protocol can be defined as the rules, formats and 
procedures that have been mutually accepted by the transacting parties.  The protocol 
specifies the procedures used for: 
 Start and abortion of data reciprocity 
 Coincidence of transmitter and remittee 
 Exposure and rectification of sending fault 
 Forms and encryption of data 
A standard protocol description is composed of five different kinds.  For the protocol to 
be full, each description should containt the following: 
1. The kind of serving the protocol will render  
2. The hypothesis about the implementation case of the protocol  
3. The messages format applied to execute the protocol 
4. The encryption of every message in the lexicon 
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5. Principles of the procedures that protect the uniformity of message exchanges [56] 
 
 
3.5. Characteristics of a Protocol 
Generally, all protocols have certain properties, and these can be summarised as 
follows:  
 Simplicity: A good-formulated protocol is built around simple individual 
pieces, which are easy to understand and execute.  Such protocols are also 
highly provable and sustainable.  
 Modularity: Each small piece in a protocol should be light-weight and capable 
of being individually developed, authenticated, executed, and sustained.  
Perpendicular tasks are not combined; they are formulated as separate entities.  
For example, error and flow control are orthogonal functions and hence should 
be separate modules. 
 Protocol should be good formative: A good-structured protocol should not be 
more than the particular and should not include any unachievable or un-
executable code.  In addition, a good-structured protocol should not be 
incomplete or under-specified.  Also, a well-structured protocol is restricted; it 
should not spate the familiar framework determines, like the determine ability 
of message lines.  Finally, a good-structured protocol is self-balance; this means 
that it should be fault-tolerant. These guarantee that the system is stable and can 
operate normally even when a passing fault uncharted variation the condition of 
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the protocol.  The correct state is achieved after a finite number of execution 
steps. 
 Robustness: A protocol should be prepared like method that it can operate in 
the full variety of networking conditions to which it may be exposed.  It should 
be able to deal with unexpected challenges such as abnormalities in input.   
 Consistency: Protocols have some standard failure modes.  Three of the more 
prominent methods of failure are:   
Deadlock: this is a condition in which no additional protocol execution is 
possible. 
Lovelock: this occurs when commands are sequentially executed 
indefinitely without achieving any successful progress.  
Improper termination: this occurs when the implementation of the protocol 




3.6. Rules of Design 
In order to achieve the characteristics of the protocols discussed above, Gerard J. 
Holzmann in [57] has suggested ten basic rules for formulating a protocol: 
1.  Ensure that the issue is good formulated.  Each standard for designing needs 
and restrictions should be determined before a layout is initiated. 
2. Specify the kind of service to be carried out at each stage of the abstraction 
before choosing the designs. 
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3. Make the protocol simple. It is very difficult to authenticate and execute 
complicated protocols; also, they are generally inefficient.  There are few 
complicated problems when formulating a protocol and the role of the designer 
is to identify and separate the easier problems after that fix the problem one by 
one.  
4. Before executing the design of a protocol, create a high-level model and ensure 
that all the requirements of the design are fulfilled. 
5. Execute the design, evaluate its capabilities, and if necessary try to modify it in 
order to achieve maximum efficiency. 
6. Ensure that the last execution is the same as the high-level design that was 
authenticated. 
7. Do not jump Rules 1 to 7. 














3.7. Cryptographic Concepts 
The protocols mentioned in this thesis rely on cryptography as the underlying security 
model.  This thesis is not about cryptography but this section has been included as a 
certain amount of background is required. 
 
 Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption is the easiest and most explicit method of sending messages 
between a sender (X) and a recipient (Y).  The two entities, X and Y, initially agree 
upon a combination number.  X writes the message, places it in a safe box, locks it up 
and submits it to Y.  When Y receives the box, he or she decrypts the message using the 
combination key that was agreed upon.  On the other hand, Y can also transmit a 
message using the same method or „protocol‟ that was used by X.  We realise that this 
protocol has symmetry as both entities (X and Y) use an odd key for coding and 
decoding.  Because of this feature, this type of protocol is known as symmetric 
encryption. If E stands for the encoding algorithm that is used, which relies upon a key 
K to encode plaintext P, then the equation for the cipher text C can be written as 
follows: 
C = EK (P) 
The following equation is for the decryption step: 
P = EK(C) 
We can also encode several times using separate keys, such as K1, K2, etc., with the 
same encoding algorithm in order to create a double encoded cipher text: 
Or a cipher text that is encoded three times: 
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When decoding, the same keys are used in the opposite order to which they were 
originally used.  
Symmetric encryption systems are extremely fast and are easier to implement than 
other systems that use separate protocols, such as asymmetric encryption.  The main 
drawback of a symmetric encryption system is that it is hard to implement because of 
its requirements and methods concerning the key exchange.   
Such requirements necessitate that all participants be configured with the secret key.  
Symmetric systems are widely used in a variety of fields, such as in financial 
institutions (principally banks) and in some military applications.  Some examples of 
symmetric encryption systems are the Digital Encryption Standard (DES) and Digital 
Encryption Standard with triple encryption (DES3) and the Advanced Encryption 




 Asymmetric Encryption 
In asymmetric encryption systems, the parties do not agree on a decryption key.  For 
example, X encrypts a message with a secret combination key only known to him.  If Y 
wants to transmit X a message, he or she must order an open lock from X.  When Y 
obtains the open lock, he then writes his message, places it in a box, locks it up and 
transmits it to X.  When X receives the box, he unlocks it and decrypts the message 




 We realize in this exchange that Y does not have to know the combination key that is 
known only to X but instead he can obtain the open lock from X when required.  The 
same process can also be initiated by Y in order to obtain a message from X.  It is 
evident that the procedures carried out by the two parties (X and Y) in sending and 
obtaining a single message is different.  In this case we can say that the protocol is 
asymmetric; any encryption system that implements this protocol is known as 
asymmetric. Note that X could use this protocol to obtain messages from various 
senders as long as they can obtain access to one of his open locks.  This can be 
achieved by X disseminating as many such locks as needed. In asymmetric encryption, 
both parties should have two keys; a public key that is shared openly by both parties, 
and a private key that is kept secret. When implementing asymmetric cryptography, the 
message is encoded using the meant remittee‟s PK.  The message is encrypted by the 
remittee using the SK. Contrary to symmetric encryption, asymmetric code face to be 
calculational intense because they need lengthy keys, hence when using them in public 
key cryptography they are normally used in association with symmetric systems.   
Asymmetric encryption is often used to transfer a session key rather than information 
proper plaintext. This session key is then used to encode information using a symmetric 
encryption system.  Therefore, this provides the key exchange advantages of 
asymmetric encryption in combination with the speed of symmetric encryption. The 
extreme usually used asymmetric code is the RSA algorithm, which is also referred to 
as public key cryptography.  This algorithm is depending on the use of specific prime 
numbers, through which the private and PK are generated for achieve the protocol. 
These prime numbers are generated by a third party whose role is mainly to distribute 
the public and private key pairs.  
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 This method or infrastructure for generating prime numbers is referred to as the Public 
Key Infrastructure or PKI.  When communicating with a number of people, the use of a 
public key is suitable because it helps us avoid multiple key-exchanges.  The public key 
provides the basis for cryptanalysis: 
C = EK (P) 
Where K refers to the public key, P can be predicted by the analyst who then confirms 
the answer by comparing C with the intercepted cipher text.  The prediction will be 
simple if it is based on data that are thought to be an element of the plaintext.  Hence, 
public key algorithms are usually formulated to avoid plaintext attack.   
Studies on public key and asymmetric systems have shown that their level of security is 




 Public-Private Key Encryption 
Public-Private Key Encryption [59, 60] is basically asymmetric, and when it comes to 
the box and combination-lock paradigm, it is based on considering a lock that has two 
combinations: one to open the lock and the other to lock it.  A second level of security 
is a fundamental feature, built on a basic assumption: combination locks can be locked 
regardless of the rotor positions. For instance, consider that Tom writes a message and 
then locks the box with a special lock formulated by Henry, using a combination 
number that is unique to Henry but is easily available to Tom and any other entity that 
wants to write a message to Henry.  We can analyse the above exchange by saying that 
the combination number is the same as the public key.  When Henry receives the 
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message, he unlocks it using a combination number that is known only to himself, and 
this is the same as a private key. In order to create such a lock, there must be some 
mechanical „property‟ linking the combination numbers needed to initially lock the box 
and open it later. This represents the main security feature of public and private key 
encryption.  This is because this feature deals with some specific and precise 
relationships that are unique to the use of prime numbers and their applications, 
concerning the creation of  pseudo-random number streams and stochastic functions in 
general [61].  
 
 Hash Function 
The hash function refers to a function that takes a string of any length as an input, and 
returns a fixed length as an output [62].  The output of the hash function is defined as 
the hash value.  The hash function is referred to as a one-way function if it is 
computationally impossible to obtain the original input from the hash value [62].  Let 
us take for example H to be the hash value, and it is computed for a message M.  In this 
case, we cannot obtain M from the hash value H.  The hash function is referred to as a 
strong-collision-resistance hash function [62] if it is computationally impossible to have 
the same hash values for separate messages.  For example, if we have two separate 
messages, M1 and M2, and the hash values for the two messages are H1 and H2, 






 Digital signatures 
Digital signatures are used to implement electronic or handwritten signatures.  The 
digital signature is a development of public key cryptography [63].  When creating a 
digital signature, a private key is required, and when authenticating the signature, a 
public key is required.  We stated in the public key cryptography section that each 
entity has a SK and a PK that are mathematically connected to each other.  For encode 
a message, the transmitter uses the PK of the recipient.  
 On the other hand, the recipient of the encoded message uses the PK for decodes the 
message.  However, in a digital signature, the sender uses his own SK to digitally sign 
the message, and then transmits it to the recipient.  The recipient of the message then 
uses the public key of the sender in order to authenticate the identity of the sender of 
the message. This is mainly due to the fact that the private key is secret and is known 
only by the owner, while the public key is accessible to all.  Although there are various 
algorithms for digital signatures, in this thesis we will only discuss the RSA signature. 
 
 
 RSA Signature 
RSA uses a public key to encrypt the message and a private key to sign it.  In order to 
create the RSA signature [64], the hash value of the message to be signed is computed, 
and then the hash value is encoded with the private key of the person who signed the 
message.  After that, the message together with the signature is sent to the recipient.  




Sig (M) = (h(M))
d
 (modn) 
To authenticate the signature [64], the recipient of the message and the signature uses 
the public key, pk, of the person who signed the message when decoding the signed 
hash value.  After that, the recipient computes the hash value of the message and 
compares the hash value computed by the receiver against the one decoded using the 
public key of the signer.  If the result matches, then the signature is authentic.  The 
function below shows the operation for decoding the signature.  In this case, H stands 
for the hash value of the signed message: 








In this chapter, a general description of electronic commerce has been presented (in the 
introduction), and the advantages of e-commerce and e-payment systems have been 
outlined.  The concept behind fair exchange protocols has been described; these 
protocols are intended to ensure fairness for both parties involved in a transaction.  
Fairness in the context of the fair exchange protocols between the merchant and the 
customer is achieved in the transaction if, at the end of the protocol execution, each 
party involved in the exchange receives the item of the other party, or none do 
[112,113]. A number of fair exchange protocols have been reviewed in this chapter, 
which can be categorized into two types; the ones that do not involve the use of a TTP 
and the ones that do.  The former allows the parties to exchange their items gradually 
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bit by bit (in parts) until the items are fully exchanged in a fair manner. The latter is 
divided into three types.  The first type involves the use of the TTP for delivering the 
items to the parties involved in the exchange; these are inline TTP-based fair exchange 
protocols.  The second type uses an online TTP, where there is minimal involvement on 
the part of the TTP.  The third type uses an offline TTP (optimistic fair exchange 
protocols).  In the optimistic fair exchange protocols, the involvement of the TTP is 
only initiated if there is a problem during the protocol execution.  Table 2 gives a 
summary of some examples of these protocols [112,113].  
Resolution of disputes in the context of fair exchange protocols has been discussed and 
some of its techniques were presented.  It has been clearly demonstrated that dispute 
resolution should be included in the fair exchange protocol to protect both parties from 
unfair dealings.  Therefore, a fair exchange protocol that reduces disputes and includes 
automated dispute resolution is required.  As can be seen in Table 2, there is minimal 
involvement on the art of the TTP in those protocols that use an offline TTP because 
the TTP will only be used if there is a problem. 
In inline TTP-based protocols, the TTP is highly involved because the TTP receives the 
parties‟ items, verifies them, and if they are correct, the TTP then delivers them to the 
parties.  Therefore, efficiency is low in protocols that are based on an inline TTP, as the 
TTP does everything, even in cases where the transacting parties are honest. The 
efficiency of protocols that are based on an online TTP is medium because the 
involvement of the TTP is relatively high, as the TTP will only be used during the 
exchange of items. This chapter also has covered the cryptographic concepts that will 
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This chapter presents the fairness protocol for purchasing items over the Internet.  The 
protocol guarantees the security of the communication channel and fairness to the 
customer and merchant.  The security of the communication channel is one of the main 
factors in fairness. Two main protocols will be discussed in this chapter.  The customer 
contacts the merchant and makes a purchase over the Internet.  The product can be 
either sent to the customer via the Internet or by post.  Therefore we discuss two 
different protocols on how to ensure fairness when using the Internet to deliver the 
item, and how to ensure fairness when using the post to deliver the item.  
 
 Assumptions 
The hypothesis below are used in the proposed protocol: 
1. All entities use similar algorithms when encoding, decoding and signing. 
2. The customer opens an account with a FSP and Merchant registers with FSP. 
3. The FSP keeps a general index server, to connected to the seller‟s account.  The 
seller has permission to enter to the site and download messages from it. 
4. All encryptions should be secure enough so that the recipient of the message 
cannot decode it without the proper key.  
5. The customer processes the payment through the FSP. 
6. Safe and secure channels are created between the entities during the exchange 
process. 
7. The pre-exchange stage takes place after the Customer identifies the commodity 
he or she wants to buy. It is assumed at this stage that both the transacting 
parties are agreed on the item to be exchanged and the price.  
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8. The channels of communication between the FSP and the Customer, and 
between the FSP and the Merchant are resilient.  A channel is said to be resilient 
if all submitted messages are obtained by their intended recipients. In the case 
of communication channel failure, fault tolerance techniques need to be applied 
to the proposed protocol. 
9. All entities have faith and trust in the FSP in the sense that it will not act 
fraudulently or conspire with any entity. 
10. The transacting parties agree on the FSP to be used for dispute resolution during 



















The notations used in the description of the proposed protocol are summarized in Table 
3: 
Symbol  Interpretation 








A  B : X A sends X to B 
X  Y Transmission from entity X to entity Y 
PK Public Key 
SK Secret Key (private key) 
TSK Temporary Session Key  
X:PK Public Key of entity „X‟ 
X:SK Secret Key of entity „X‟ 
X:PKS[ ] The data are Signed using the Private Key of entity „X‟ 
X:SKE[ ] The data are Encrypted using the Secret Key of entity „X‟ 






4.1. The proposed Protocol  
 For digital product  
This protocol discusses the communication channels and their communication contents 
when ordering an online product that can be delivered via the Internet.  There are three 
main parties involved in this protocol.  The Merchant (M) is the user with the product 
who would like to sell it, and the Customer (C) is the person who wants to buy the 
items from the seller.  The Customer must pay the merchant either before or after 
receiving the product.   
The payment over the Internet is managed by a Financial Services Provider (FSP).  The 
Customer transfer the payment to the FSP, and it then transfer the payment to the 
Merchant.  Thus, both the Customer and the Merchant should be registered with the 
FSP before invoking this protocol.  The FSP is the entity that ensures the fairness of the 
protocol; it makes sure that the buyer gets the right item and that the seller gets the 
correct payment for that product.  If the product is not transfer to the buyer by the 
seller, then the FSP takes the necessary steps to ensure fairness.  
The following are the main entities in this protocol: 
 Merchant: the entity that sells the product  
 Customer: the entity that wants to buy the product  
 Financial Service Provider: a third party that is trusted by the seller and the 
buyer.  The FSP should be capable to process the payment (credit card, PayPal, 
etc) from the Customer and then credit the Merchant.  Meanwhile, it should be 
able to reverse the transactions of the two parties should a dispute arise. When a 
dispute arises because a product has not been delivered to the Customer (after 
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payment), this party acts to resolve the dispute, such as taking the necessary 
steps to send the product to the Customer; this ensures fairness in the protocol.  
 
 Protocol description 
 Pre-requisites 
The following are the pre-requisites of the protocol:  
 The Merchant has outlet to the Internet and all the obtainable products are 
viewable on the Internet, or else the product information can be sent to another 
party via the Internet.  
 The Customer has access to the Internet and he knows the identity of the 
merchant  
 The Merchant registers with the Financial Service Provider.  The customer 
should be aware of the presence of the FSP and its responsibilities.  The 
Merchant should be able to accept payments from the FSP.  










 Pre-exchange phase 
The Customer finds the Merchant‟s information on the Internet and views the list of 
products that can be purchased.  Any product is sent directly to the Customer by the 
Merchant; it should not be altered by anyone in the middle. Thus, the integrity of the 
potential transaction is protected.  Then, the Customer chooses the itemt hat he wants to 
buy locates the identification of the product and clicks the „check out‟ button.  The 
Merchant generates a temporary session key.  This key can be used to code and decode 
the product; the security of this encryption is valid for a short period only (due to the 
small size of the key). The Merchant then encrypts the product using the temporary 
session key.  The temporary session key will then be used by the buyer to decode the 
item.  Meanwhile, the seller generates the invoice for the product.  The invoice details 
the price that consumer should pay for the item.  Then, the invoice and the temporary 
session key are sent to the FSP; the message cannot be sent as plain text.  The merchant 
is now registered with the FSP.   
The FSP has a public key certificate, and so the message is coded using the PK of the 
FSP.  This encryption protects the confidentiality of the message.  Before the message 
is encrypted, it is signed by the SK of the Merchant to protect the integrity of the 
message, so that no one else will be able to generate a fake message. 
 
Pr-m1: Merchant  Financial Service Provider (FSP) 
M: SK S [tSK, Invoice]. 





The invoice consists of the next information: 
 The product specifications, Di 
 The identity of the customer, C 
 The identity of the merchant, M. 
The FSP verifies the invoice and then signs it using its SK, and transfer it back to the 
Merchant.  Also, the message is coded using the public key of the Merchant.  The 
digital signature on the invoice verifies that the invoice is received by the FSP, who has 
the relevant temporary session key, as the FSP is the only entity that has access to its 
private key.   
The message is coded using the Merchant‟s PK to protect the confidentiality of the 
communication.  
Pre-m2: Financial Service Provider (FSP)  Merchant 
FSP: SK S [Invoice]. 
 
Message content: Signed Invoice by the Financial Service Provider, Public Key 
Certificate of the Financial Service Provider. 
 
The Merchant receives the signed invoice from the FSP.  Firstly, the message should be 
decrypted correctly through the private key of the Merchant, and then the invoice 
should be verified using the public key certificate of the FSP.  If either fails, then the 













Figure 14: Pre-exchange phase 
 
 Exchange phase 
Seller transfers the bill and the product to the consumer.  The product is encrypted 
using the temporary session key.  The whole message is signed using the SK of the 
Merchant; this is to protect the integrity of the message.  Meanwhile, the message 
consists of the FSP‟s public key (or the Customer should be able to obtain this key from 
the Internet).  The invoice is already signed by the FSP.   
Meanwhile, the Merchant adds a timestamp onto the message in order to prevent 
„replay‟ attacks, so that an attacker will not be able to replay the same message back to 
the customer later. 
M1: Merchant  Customer     
M: SK S [tSK E [Product], Invoice, FSP: PK, FSP: SK S [Invoice], Timestamp]. 
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Message content: Invoice, Encrypted Product, Information about Financial Service 
Provider, Timestamp. 
   
The consumer gets the message from the seller and extracts it.  Firstly, he validates the 
digital signature on the invoice against the FSP‟s public key certificate.  If the invoice 
is successfully validated, then the business between the Customer and the Merchant 
will be deemed fair (and will be guaranteed by the FSP).  Then, the Customer finds the 
FSP‟s information in order to pay for the items.  Meanwhile, the message has the item 
in it but the Customer will not be able to access it without the temporary key.  Then, the 
consumer transfers the invoice and the payment details to the FSP. The message is 
coded using the PK of the FSP, and this key can be found in the public key certificate 
of the FSP.  The payment information can be credit card details, bank information, etc.; 
this information will be visible to any other parties in this protocol.  
 
M2: Customer  Financial Service Provider  
C: PK E [Payment Information, Invoice]. 
Message content: Invoice, Payment Information.  
 
The FSP verifies the invoice against the Merchant‟s public key certificate, and then 
processes the payment for the given amount.  Then, he generates a payment 
confirmation.  This payment confirmation and the sent invoice are signed using the SK 
of the FSP.  This ensures the integrity of the message, and the message is then transfer 
back to the Customer. This is the declaration of that the consumer has made the 
payment for the issued invoice.  Meanwhile, the payment confirmation can be found on 
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the FSP‟s server, so that the Merchant will be able to find out if the Customer has 
indeed made the payment detailed in the issued invoice.  If the seller is happy with the 
payment by the Customer, then he should release the temporary session key to the 
Customer.  Only then will the Customer be able to decrypt the product and access it. 
So, the Merchant signs the temporary session key using his SK (to protect the integrity 
of the message), and sends the message to customer.  
 
M3: Merchant  Customer     
M: SK S [tSK]. 
The Customer decrypts the product using the tSK and starts using it.  If the product 
cannot be accessed using the sent temporary session key, the Customer requests the 
merchant to resend the key.  On the other hand, the Merchant is able to send the 












Figure 15: the exchange phase  
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 For a physical product 
 Pre-exchange phase 
The Customer finds the merchants information on the Internet and views the list of 
products that can be purchased.  The Customer then chooses the item that he wants to 
buy, locates the identification of the product (product ID, product details and merchant 
ID) clicks the „check out‟ button.  The seller gets the product order from the consumer, 
and then generates an invoice for that product.  The invoice states the price that the 
consumer should pay for the item.  The seller sends the invoice to the FSP; this 
message cannot be send as plain text.  The Merchant is now registered with the FSP.  
The FSP has a public key certificate, and so the message is coded using the PK of the 
FSP.  This encryption protects the confidentiality of the message.  Before the message 
is encrypted, it is signed by the SK of the Merchant to protect the integrity of the 
message (to stop someone else from being able to generate a fake message). 
 
Pre-m1: Merchant  Financial Service Provider (FSP) 
M: SK S [Invoice]. 
The invoice consists of the next information: 
 The item specifications, Di 
 The identity of the customer, C 
 The identity of the merchant, M. 
The FSP verifies the invoice and then signs it using its SK; it then transfers it back to 
the Merchant.  Also, the message is coded using the PK of the Merchant.  The digital 
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signature on the invoice verifies that the invoice has been received by the FSP; it has 
the relevant temporary session key, as the FSP is the only entity that has access to its 
private key.  The message is coded using the Merchant‟s PK to protect the 
confidentiality of the communication.  
Pre-m2: Financial Service Provider (FSP)  Merchant 
FSP: SK S [Invoice]. 
Message content: Signed Invoice by the Financial Service Provider, Public Key 
Certificate of the Financial Service Provider. 
The Merchant receives the signed invoice from the FSP.  Firstly, the message should be 
decrypted correctly through the private key of the Merchant, and then the invoice 
should be verified using the public key certificate of the FSP.  If either fails, then the 












 Exchange Phase 
The seller transfers the invoice to the consumer.  The whole message is signed using 
the private key of the Merchant; this is to protect the integrity of the message.  
Meanwhile, the message consists of the FSP‟s public key (or the Customer should be 
able to obtain this key from the Internet).  That public key contains information about 
the service provider to which the Customer should make the payment.   
The invoice is already signed by the FSP.  Meanwhile, the Merchant adds a timestamp 
to the message to prevent replay attacks, so that an attacker will not be able to replay 
the same message back to the customer later on.   
 
M1: Merchant  Customer     
M: SK S [Invoice, FSP: PK, R: SK S [Invoice], Timestamp] 
Content of the Invoice: Invoice: [Product ID, Merchant ID, Price] 
Message content: Invoice, Information about Financial Service Provider, Timestamp. 
 
The consumer gets the message from the seller and extracts it.  Then, the Customer 
validates the digital signature on the invoice against the FSP‟s public key certificate.  If 
the invoice is successfully validated, then the business between the customer and the 
merchant will be deemed fair; it will be guaranteed by the FSP.  The Customer will 
then find the FSP‟s information for pay the product.  
To make the payment, the consumer transfers the invoice and the payment details to the 
FSP.  The message is coded using the PK of the FSP, and this key can be found in the 
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public key certificate of the FSP.  The payment information can be credit card details, 
bank information, etc.  This information will be visible to other parties in this protocol.  
 
M2: Customer  Financial Service Provider  
C: PK E [Payment Information, Invoice]. 
Message content: Invoice, Payment Information. 
 
The FSP verifies the invoice against the Merchant‟s public key certificate, and then 
processes the payment for the given amount; the FSP then generates a payment 
confirmation.  This payment confirmation and the sent invoice are signed using the SK 
of the FSP.  This ensures the integrity of the message, and the message is then sent 
back to the Customer.  This is the proof that consumer has pay the payment for the 
issued invoice.  Meanwhile, the payment confirmation can be found on the FSP‟s 
server, so the Merchant will be able to find out if the Customer has indeed made the 
payment of the issued invoice.  If the seller is happy with the payment by the customer, 
he then delivers the product to the Customer. 
 
Merchant  Delivery Cabinet  





















Figure 17: The exchange phase of the Alternative Protocol  
 
The Customer waits for the product to be delivered, and then checks the product once it 
has arrived.  If the product is not similar to the one ordered, then the consumer returns 
the item to the Merchant, who will then refund the money or send the correct product.  
When refunding, the Merchant contacts the FSP, who refunds the money back into the 











4.2. Dispute resolution  
There can be scenarios in which the temporary session key has not been sent to the 
consumer next he gets the payment conformation from the FSP.  In that event, the 
consumer transfers the payment confirmation and the invoice to the FSP.  This is the 
same message that was sent by the FSP after the payment was made.  
 
Af-M1: Customer  Online Purchase Regulator 
 FSP: SK S [Payment Confirmation, Invoice] 
Message content: Invoice, Payment Confirmation. 
 
The FSP signs the invoice and the payment confirmation.  The signed message is 
verified using the public key certificate of the FSP.  Then the FSP verifies the digital 
signature on the invoice; it should be the signature that was inserted by it.  If the digital 
signature is successfully validated, then the message is transfer to the seller, asking the 
seller to release the temporary session key to the Customer.  
 
Af-M2: the Financial Service Provider  Merchant 
FSP: SK S [Payment Confirmation, Invoice] 




If merchant has not released the temporary session key, then the FSP has a copy of that 
key, which was given to it by the merchant when issuing the invoice.  So, that key is 
sent to the Customer by the FSP.   
Af-M1: Financial Service Provider  Customer 



























4.3. Dispute Analysis 
At the end of exchanging a digital commodity and a payment (between the two 
transacting parties, the Merchant (M) and the Customer (C)), there are three 
possibilities for C (here we consider a normal exchange where no protocols are used): 
 
1) C obtained the correct digital commodity 
2) C obtained an incorrect digital commodity 
3) C did not obtain any digital commodity 
 
There are also three possibilities for M: 
1) M received the correct payment 
2) M received an incorrect payment 
3) M did not receive the payment at all 
 
The incorrect digital commodity scenario means that the obtained digital commodity is 
not the one that C had ordered, whereas the incorrect payment scenario means that the 
received payment is not the same as the price requested by M. 
Table 4 illustrates the combination of these possibilities for C and M.  In Table 4, X 
denotes that each  Participant (C or M) has not obtained the requested product under no 
conditions, or each  Participant has obtained an wrong product; while √ denotes that the 
right product has been obtained. observe that the decision of the resolve is not 





 C M 
Result 
Receives digital product Receives payment 
1 √ √ No dispute 
2 √ X M disputes 
3 X √ C disputes 
4 X X 
There are possibilities 
for disputes by both C 
and M 
Table 4: Dispute possibilities 
 
 
 C M 
Result Receives decryption 
key 
Receives payment 
1 √ √ No dispute 
2 √ X Not applicable 
3 X √ C disputes 
4 X X 
No dispute / Not 
applicable / C‟s fault 
Table 5: Disputes possibilities for the proposed protocol    
 
 In the above tables, we realise that if M and C obtain each other‟s items, then there is 
no need for a dispute (case 1 in Table 4).  If C obtains the ordered digital commodity 
and M either obtains an incorrect payment or does not receive the payment at all, then 
M will dispute (case 2 in Table 4).  On the other hand, if M obtains the correct payment 
and C either obtains a wrong product or does not receive the product at all, then C will 
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dispute (case 3 in Table 4).  Finally, case number 4 in Table 3 has four possibilities, 
which are as follows: 
1. If both entities (C and M) do not obtain each other‟s items, then there will be 
no dispute, as no one is disadvantaged.  
2. If both entities (C and M) gain wrong products every party (i.e. C obtains a 
wrong digital commodity and M obtains an incorrect payment), then each party 
C and M will dispute. 
3. If C obtains a wrong product and M does not obtain the payment absolutely, 
then both parties (C and M) will dispute. 
4. If M obtains an incorrect payment and C does not obtain the digital commodity 
at all, then both entities (C and M) will dispute. 
For the proposed protocol (Table 5), the two parties (C and M) actually exchange a 
payment (from C) and the decryption key for the encoded digital commodity (from M).  
This is because M transmits the encrypted digital commodity to C, and C verifies it; if 
satisfied, the two parties then formalize the exchange of the payment and the decryption 
key.  The correct order of the exchange process of the payment and the decryption key 
in the proposed protocol is that M obtains a correct payment before C obtains the 
decryption key. 
The following scenarios study the cases presented in Table 5, which presents all the 
possible scenarios for dispute in the proposed protocol (the meanings of X and √ in 




1. In scenario 1, both C and M obtain the correct product that they have ordered 
(i.e. C obtains decryption key and M obtains the correct payment).  Therefore, 
there is no dispute. 
2. In scenario 2, C obtains a right coded key, and merchant obtains a wrong 
payment or does not obtain the payment absolutely. The scenario is not relevant 
in the proposed protocol, as customers have to submit a right payment in order 
to obtain the right coded key. 
3. In scenario three, customer either obtains a wrong coded key or does not obtain 
the decryption key absolutely, and merchant obtains the right payment.  In such 
situation customer should lodge a complaint to the FSP. 
4. In scenario 4, the potentials are: 
a) Neither party (C nor M) obtain each other‟s items.  Therefore, there will 
be no dispute, as they have not disclosed their items to each other.  
b) Parties (C and M) obtain the wrong product from each other, i.e. C 
receives the wrong coded key and a merchant obtains a wrong 
payment.  The scenario is not relevant in this proposed protocol; as 
customers have to transmit the right payment for obtain a correct 
decoded key.  Hence, if M discovers that the wrong payment has been 
sent, after that merchant shouldn‟t submit a decoded key absolutely. 
c) C obtains a wrong decoded key and merchant doesn‟t obtain a payment 
absolutely. The scenario is not relevant in this proposed protocol, as 
customers have to transmit the right payment in order to obtain the 
correct decryption key.  As well, if merchants haven‟t obtained a 
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payment, thereafter merchant shouldn‟t deliver a decoded key 
absolutely. 
d) Custmoer doesn‟t obtain a decoded key and merchant obtains the 
wrong payment.  Here is a common situation, as merchant shouldn‟t 
submit the decoded key to customer if a payment is incorrect.  In other 
words, C has to deliver the right payment for obtain a correct decoded 
key from M.  Therefore, in this situation, C raises a dispute with the 
FSP.  C must deliver the correct payment to the FSP.  Whether 
customer delivers the right payment to the FSP, thereafter the FSP 
should organize solve for each parties, customer and merchant.  M can 
undoubtedly decide to ignore the incorrect payment but if the FSP 
discovers that the wrong payment has been sent, then C‟s request for a 
dispute will be refused. 
The proposed protocol has been formulated in a way that minimizes disputes.  In 
addition, C is the only party that will ask for solve, as merchant should not deliver an 
item until the correct product is received from C.  
 For extention to the above scenarios, the next situations are also discussed. 
 Customer ask for solve that after decrypting the digital product, he finds the 
item is wrong.  This scenario is impossible, as FSP: PK ensures that the item is 
right; also, Customer should not have delivered the payment to M if he 
discovers that the wrong D has been sent.  Therefore, it is Customer‟s 
responsibility (to delivering a payment to merchants when he had reservations 
for the item).  At the moment when customer delivers a payment to merchant, 
it is a clear indication that C is satisfied with D, and hence C cannot raise any 
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dispute because the protocol rules allows customer to verify the commodity 
prior sending the money to merchant.  
 Although it is quite evident merchant shouldn‟t ask for solve , as merchant 
obtains the payment before delivering the decoded key to customer, the next 
situation are thoughtful: 
o M alleges that he has obtained the wrong payment from C.  This is an 
unlikely scenario, as C is aware of the protocol‟s rule that if he delivers 
the wrong payment, he shouldn‟t obtain a decoded key.  But, if this case 
occurs, customer‟s responsibility (for delivering the incorrect payment).  
Hence M will not deliver the decryption key if he obtained the incorrect 





4.4. Analysis of Scenarios 
When implementing the proposed protocol between C and M, there are various 
possible scenarios, which include the following:  
a) Parties, consumer and merchant, are acting fairly. 
b) Consumer is acting unfairly, and merchant is acting fairly. 
c) Merchant is dishonest and acting unfairly, while consumer is acting fairly. 
d) Each parties Consumer and Merchant are dishonest and acting unfairly. 
The possible scenarios for executing the protocol are as follows: 
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1) Both parties, Consumer and Merchant, are fair in their dealings, which leads 
to normal implementation of the protocol, where M submits a correct M1, C 















Figure 19: Proposed Protocol, Scenario 1 
 
 
2) C aborts the protocol after obtaining M1 because M1 is either wrong or C has 





Figure 20: Scenario 2 
 
3) After obtaining M1, C communicates with the FSP before sending M2.  If, the 
FSP discovers that AF-M1 is wrong, then the FSP transmit a revoke message to 
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Figure 21: Scenario 3 
4) The same as scenario number 3 but in this situation, the FSP found that AF-M1 
is correct.  Hence, the FSP will try to create a fair exchange for C by sending a 
warning to M in AF-M2 in addition to submitting the saved tSK to C in AF-


















5) C obtains M1 from M who discovers that M1 is right, and after that C transmits 
M2 to the FSP.  Consumer waits for M3 from M but obtains nothing.  Hence, 
C communicates with the FSP for settlement.  But, if the FSP discovers that 
AF-M1 is wrong, it transmits a revoke message to C.  There are two situations 
as to wherefore merchant failed to send M3 to C.  These possibilities are either 
because M discovered that M2 was wrong or because M is dishonest in his 
dealings.  If M2 is incorrect, then it is C‟s responsibility (for sending an 
incorrect M2 to M).  In the latter scenario (where M2 is correct but M is 
dishonest), then C needs to send AF-M1 to the FSP in order to obtain a 













Figure 23: Scenario 5 
 
6) After C receives M1 from M, C discovers that M1 is right, and then C transmits 
M2 to the FSP.  M then discovers that M2 is right and transmits M3 to C.  
However, C communicates with the FSP for resolution after obtaining M3.  If 
the FSP discovers that AF-M1 is wrong, it transmits a revoke message to 
consumer.  In this scenario, consumer communicated with the FSP for two 
possible reasons; the first is that M3 is wrong, and another is that M3 is right 
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However C intends to find out which he able to obtain from the FSP in order to 
gain an unfair advantage over M.  However, in both possibilities, C must 









Figure 24: Scenario 6 
 
7) The same as scenario number 6 However there, the AF-M1 which C transmits 
to the FSP is right.  Hence, the FSP solve it by submitting AF-M2 to M and 


















Therefore, it is clear from the above scenarios, Consumer and Merchant  are achieve 
the fairness. On the other hand, the following scenarios study where the messages (M1, 
M2, M3, AF-M1, AF-M2 and AF-M3) of the proposed protocol are sent but have not 
been received because of a failure in the communication channels between the parties 
involved in the protocol: 
1) If M1 is not received by C, then fairness will not be compromised because no 
one has revealed their item; C will not send M2 if he has not received a correct 
M1. 
2) If M2 is not received by the FSP, then M will consider that C is not interested 
in the exchange, and hence M will not send M3.  As a result, C will wait for M3 
from M and as M has not obtained M2 from C, M will not submit M3.  
Therefore, C will contact the FSP for resolution.  However, there is the 
possibility that the communication channel failed; this possibility will be 
studied later. 
3) If M3 is not received by C, then C will consider it as M behaving dishonestly.  
As a result, C will contact the FSP for resolution.  However, there is the 
possibility that the communication channel failed. 
4) If AF-M1 is not received by the FSP, then C needs to re-contact the FSP, again 
asking for a resolution. 
5) If AF-M2 is not received by M, then there are two possibilities: 
a. If AF-M2 is not received by M (and M has not received a correct M2) 




b. If AF-M2 is not received by M but AF-M3 is received by C, then 
fairness is compromised if, and only if, M has not received a correct M2. 
6) If AF-M3 is not received by C then there are two possibilities: 
a. If AF-M3 is not received by C and at the same time AF-M2 is not 
received by M (and also M has not received a correct M2), then fairness 
is not compromised. 
b. If AF-M3 is not received by C but AF-M2 is received by M, then 
fairness is compromised if, and only if, C has not received a correct M3. 
As can be seen in these cases, the channels of communication among all parties should 
be resilient for fairness to be ensured.  To ensure fairness even in the case of 
communication channel failure, fault tolerance techniques need to be applied to the 




4.5. Comparisons of Protocols 
Only three messages are required for exchange the item, and these three messages are 
also used in the case of disputes. 
The way in which products (digital or physical) and payments are exchanged online is 
that a customer delivers the money to a seller, after the seller confirms the correctness 
of the money. If the payment is right, the seller delivers the item to the buyer.  This 
method is applied in most protocols (MP).   
However, the method that is applied in our protocol is that the merchant delivers an 
encrypted digital commodity to the customer, and then the customer verfiy the validity 
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of the coded item.  If the buyer is happy with the digital item, then he delivers the 
money to the merchant. 
Each has advantages and disadvantages.  The advantage of the method applied in most 
protocols is that it follows the conventional order of exchange, where a buyer transmits 
a money first, after that the seller sends a product. Therefore, neither customers nor 
merchants will feel that there has been any change in the way they conduct business.  
On the other hand, they will notice a difference in our protocol, as the merchant begin 
the process by transfering the items.   
Additionally, in the MP, the merchant receives the first message (M1), which contains 
the encrypted payment, but then the merchant may decide not to complete the 
exchange, i.e. not to send the second message (M2) to the customer.  However, in our 
protocol the customer receives the first message (M1), which contains the encrypted 
digital product, but then the customer may decide not to complete the exchange, i.e. not 
to send the second message (M2) to the merchant.   
Therefore, if our protocol and the MP are compared in this respect (i.e. the party who 
receives M1 decides not to complete the exchange because either they are not interested 
in the exchange or M1 is incorrect), then our protocol would be better in that it involves 
less encryption. 
The MP places more responsibility on the merchant to find a digital product that 
matches customer‟s requirements.  In this way, the merchant is forced to be fairly, and 
transmits the right digital commodity to the customer so that he can obtain the 
decryption key in order to decrypt the encrypted payment[4].  
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 Our protocol, on the other hand, places more responsibility on the customer to deliver 
the right price for obtain the decoded key to decode the coded digital product.  In this 
way, the customer is forced to be honest. 
In the case of disputes, the total size of the messages in the dispute resolution phase for 
MOP is greater than the size of the messages (i.e. AFM1, AF-M2, and AF-M3) in the 
dispute resolution phase for our protocol. The reason for this is that in MP, the 
encrypted digital commodity is included in at least two messages, while in our protocol; 





# messages in process  phase # messages in solve problems phase Starts the exchange 
3 3 M 
Party who raises 
disputes 
# of modular exponentiations 
(process phase) 
# of modular exponentiations 
(solve problems phase) 
C 12 6 
Table 6: Features of our protocol 
 
 
4.6. The Timing of the Protocol 
The timing of the execution of the new protocol is debated in this part (the timing 
numbers are in nanoseconds). 
The specifications of the computer used to perform and measure these timings are as 
follows.  The processor is Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU M460@ 2053GHz 2053 and 4GB 
of RAM.  For the protocol, three scenarios are carried out.  The first one has a digital 
109 
 
product (D) sized 28KB, the second one has a digital product (D) sized 2.2MB, and the 
third one has a digital product (D) sized 10MB. 
 
Table 7: Timings of the proposed protocol 
 
In the table above, we can see that the time is longer when a digital product is tranmit 













size = 10 MB 
Pr-M1 Generating temporary session key 14 35 105 
Pr-M1 Encrypting temporary session key 12 38 114 
Pr-M1 Sending encrypted temporary session key 23.7 239 717 
Pr-M1 Sending invoice details 4 4 12 
Pr-M2 Generating message digest for signing 
invoice 
3 29 87 
M1 Encrypting product using session key 34 53.6 160.8 
M1 Encrypting the product, invoice and FSP 
PK 
20 98 294 
M1 Sending the product, invoice and FSP PK 
to the customer 
147 537 1611 
M1 Decrypting merchant message 47 59 177 
M2 Validating invoice received from customer 3 3 9 
M3 Sending session key to customer 61 78 234 
Total 368.7 1173.6 3520.8 
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(see table 7), when the digital product size is 2.2MB, is greater than the time needed 
when the digital product size is 28KB. 
 
 
4.6.1. Cost functions for the proposed protocol 
In this section, a cost function is devised for the proposed protocol.  The cost function 
to be devised concerns with the time needed to form/construct the messages of the 
exchange phase of the protocol.  There are three messages required, and therefore, a 
cost function is devised for each message; then, a general cost function is devised for 
the all the messages of the protocol. 
M1: 
The message M1 includes:  
 The product is coded using the tsk. 
 The whole message is coded using the SK of the merchant. 
 The message consists of the Financial Service Provider‟s public key. 
 That public key has the information about the service provider to whom the 
consumer should make the payment. 
 Invoice: [Product information, Merchant ID]. 
M1: Merchant  Consumer     
M: SK S [ tSK E[D], N, FSP:PK, FSP: SK S [N] ]. 
N: [Di, Merchant ID, C]. 
M will need to construct the items (SK S, tSK E[D], N, FSP: PK, FSP: SK S [N]).  So, 
the cost function for M1 is the sum of the time needed to construct these items: 
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f(M1) = SKS +  tSK E[D] + N + FSP: PK + FSP: SK S [N]. 
The time needed for constructing tSK E[D] will change according to the size of the 
digital product (D), whereas the time needed to construct the other  items will remain 
roughly the same because the size of the keys will remain the same in any message, 
even if the keys change.  Therefore, the cost function for M1 is: 
f(M1) = c1 + tSK E[D]  + c2 + c3 + c4 
Where c1, c2, c3 and c4 are constants that represent the time needed to construct SKS, 
N, FSP: PK, FSP: SK S [N], respectively. 
M2: 
The message M2 includes two items, namely, Payment Information (Pi) and N.  
Therefore, the cost function for M2 is the sum of the time needed to construct these two 
items: 
f(M2) = Pi + N 
The payment normally includes specific information (such as the names of the payer 
and payee, and the amount) which has roughly the same size even if the information 
included in the payment is different.  Therefore, the time needed to construct the two 
items included in M2 will remain roughly the same in any message.  Therefore, the cost 
function for M2 is: 
f(M2) = c5 + c6 
where c5 and c6 are constants that represent the time needed to construct Pi and N, 
respectively. 
M3: 
The message M3 includes one item, which is SK S [tSK].  Therefore, the cost function 
for M3 is: 
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f(M3) = SK S [tSK]. 
The time needed to construct M3 will remain roughly the same even if the session key 
changes because the size of the keys will be the same.  Therefore, the cost function for 
M3 is: 
f(M3) = c7 
where c7 is a constant that represents the time needed to construct SK S [tSK]. 
 
 
4.6.2. The cost function for the proposed protocol: 
 
The cost function for the proposed protocol is the sum of the cost functions for M1, M2 
and M3.  That is: 
f(proposed  protocol) = f(M1) + f(M2) + f(M3) 
f(proposed  protocol) = (c1 + tSK E[D] + c2 + c3 + c4 )+ (c5 + c6 )+ (c7). 
f(proposed  protocol) = tSK E[D] + c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 + c5 + c6 + c7. 
f(proposed  protocol) = tSK E[D] + C (where C is the sum of all constants) 
The time needed to construct the messages will increase significantly as the size of the 
digital product increases.  Otherwise, the time will remain roughly the same if the size 
of the digital product remains the same.  The time needed to construct the messages of 





4.7. Comparisons with Other Protocols 
 The comparisons will be made in accordance with a number of different properties; (1) 
How many massages required in every phase?, (2) Is the trusted third party save the 
item?, (3) Which party will arise the dispute?, and (4)compare the modular 
exponentiations numbers  .These different criteria will help improve the protocol by 
reduce the time for send and receive the messages, Reduce the time for generates and 
verify the messages and the use of TTP is only for verifying the items not use for 
delivering or store the items that will be exchange will be reduce the load on network. 
To make fair comparisons, three of the protocols to be compared with ours have the 
same characteristics; these are Zhang et al. [30], Devane et al. [32], Q. Zhang et al. 














Table 8: Comparison of fair exchange protocols 
 
The proposed protocol has the least number of messages (among the other protocols) 
required to be exchanged. With regard to dispute resolution, all the protocols apart from 
the Ray et al. protocol [33] have the same numbers of messages required in the dispute 
resolution phase. To measure the performance of the proposed protocol, we performed 
a simulation of the Zhang et al. protocol [43] and the Devane et al. protocol [44], and 
compared the results of each one with our protocol. The purpose of performance 
evaluations is to measure the computation time of each message, and to determine the 

























Medium High 1 Yes 
Payment and a 
product (digital or 
physical) 
Zhang et al. 
Strong 7 Medium High 1 Yes 







5 Medium High 3 Yes 
Provide the originator 
and the intended 
recipient with 






12 Medium High 1 Yes 
Payment and digital 
product 
Q. Zhang et 
al. 







efficacious than other protocols By testing our protocol, our work has proved that the 
process of the proposed protocol is workable. When it is implemented in the real world, 
the length of the asymmetric keys becomes the main factor affecting the protocol‟s 
performance; in other words, increasing the length of the asymmetric keys (to generate 
the highest possible level of security) will increase the computation time 
significantly.The Ray et al. protocol allows the TTP to keep the merchant‟s product 
before the exchange process between the customer and the merchant occurs.  This 
creates a burden on the part of the TTP, as the TTP is then responsible for storage and 
security assurance.  According to the Ray, the TTP must contact both parties (customer 
and merchant) if either party has a dispute; however, in the other protocols, the 
polemicist and the trusted third party are engaged only.   
Engaging all Participants in dispute resolution could need a lot of messages to 
exchange items, so the creating communication overload may be occure. Table 9 below 
compares all the various protocols and it clearly shows how the proposed protocol has 
the less number of messages and less number of modular exponentiations. Thus, the 
new protocol is a widely effective and efficacious protocol. When we say "more 
efficient" we mean that: 
 Reduce the communication overload and solve bottleneck problems by: 
 Reduce the numbers of messages to be exchange between the parties. 
 Reduce the time for constructing the messages. 
 Reduce the time for generates and verify the messages. 
 The use of TTP is only for verifying the items not use for delivering or store the 
items that will be exchange. 




















# messages in the 
process 
phase 
6 7 4 4 7 12 3 













TTP type Inline Online Offline Offline Online Online Online 
TTP holds item Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 





Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 














































 Formal Analysis (verification) 
 Model Checking 
 Spin Model Checker  




This chapter discusses the formal verification process of protocols. Model 






5.1. Formal Verification of Protocol 
It is vital to use formal analysis during the verification process in order to discover any 
unforeseen errors in the design of the system.  Several methods can be adopted in 
executing the formal process of verification, and these include manual proofs, theorem 
proving, and model checking [65, 66].  Some of the drawbacks associated with manual 
proofs are that they take a long time to execute, are slow and tend to be error-prone [65, 
66].  A human user is required in theorem proving; if the theorem prover discovers a 
fault, then no detailed analysis of the primary cause of the glitch in the system is 
needed. Formal methods used for the purpose of protocol or system validation usually 
adopt the following technique: in the first two initial steps, high-level formal notations 
are used in order to (1) make a formal analysis, (2) identify officially the features with 
will be assessed.  The formal verification process of the protocol is often long, 
complicated and error-prone.  In the third step, the protocol is authenticated against its 
attributes through an automated verification tool that can read these notations.  When 
assessing the security protocols of a system, various verification techniques can be 




Table 10: Summary of formal verification methods.  [67]. 
 
In this research, we will use model checking for the formal verification of the fairness 
property of the protocols, using a model checker called SPIN. 
 
 
5.2. Model checking 
Model checking is a formal method for verifying finite-state concurrent systems.  The 
description of the system to be authenticated is expressed as a suitable dialectics 
(normally a temporal dialectics like as computational tree logic(CTL) [68], linear 
temporal logic(LTL) [69], and alternalting time temporal logic (ATL) [70]).  It 
confirms if the fromwork fulfils this characteristic by looking into each the likely 
activities of the framwork.  Raskin et al have tried to prove in [71] wherefore model 
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checking is the best formal method for the authentication of fair exchange protocols.  
This method is the best suitable because the model protocols are treated as games and 
their participants as players.  Fair exchange protocols are composed of many sub-
protocols that can be applied at various times when carrying out a protocol.  Hence 
these protocols are not linear, contrary to key exchange and authentication protocols.   
The sub-protocols are supposed to be carried out in a predefined sequence.  If they are 
carried out contrary to the protocol designer‟s predefined order, a possible security 
breach may occur.  The key feature of layout a protocols as play will be any attempt to 
disrupt the operation of the system can be taken into consideration.  During every stage 
of the play (the process of the protococl ), every entity or player (protocol parties) can 
make more than one move.  A parties must follow the protocol by sending the precise 
message as specified by the protocol, but he or she can pose a threat by transmitting a 
message that is not consistent with the original one.  These messages that are 
inconsistent with the original protocol can be designed by merging parts of previous 
messages and then applying different computations. 
The model checking method is used to confirm that the protocol fulfils a specific 
property.  It examines all feasible operations of the game (a model of the protocol).  
This means that it confirms the feasible combination of all the moves of the participants 
(players).  Regardless of the moves, the property will always hold as far as it has been 
authenticated by a model.  We can verify the fact that the fairness of the protocol 






5.2.1. SPIN Model Checker 
This model checker was created in the 1980s by Holzmann at Bell Laboratories.  It is 
one the most popular tools and was given in 2001 the ACM‟s prestigious System 
Software Award [72].  SPIN is a tool that is free and open source. SPIN is work here to 
authenticate the fairness feature of the protocol mentioned in this thesis.  The main 
reason for choosing SPIN is that despite being a model checker it is also a simulation 
tool.  Thus, it aids in simulating the assumptions of the suggested protocol.  The second 
reason for adopting SPIN is that it can successfully validate fair exchange protocols 
[73, 74].  The third reason is that the modelling language that is recognised by SPIN for 
model specification resembles the C language, which is a language that is simple to 
learn.  Fourthly, SPIN is a powerful free and open source tool, which is widely 
available.  When applying SPIN to authenticate the fairness property of a system, the 
authentication language, Promela (Process Meta Language) [72], must be used to 
identify the model.  In addition, the fairness property of the protocol to be authenticated 
is identified using LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [72].  After the model and the 
properties have been successfully verified, they are fed into SPIN‟s GUI (Graphical 
User Interface), which is known as iSPIN. 
If there is any syntax error, iSpin will detect it.  If no errors are found at all in the 
specification, then SPIN will confirm whether the specified property has been 
authenticated against the specified model.  If the result confirms that the verification is 
valid, it will be indicated on the GUI.  On the other hand, if the verification of the 
property fails, a counterexample will be given, which will detect the cause of the error 






Promela (Process Meta Language) is the language of authentication that is understood 
by SPIN.  There are three main objects that any Promela mode is made from [4]:   
 Processes 
 Data objects  
 Message channels [72]  
Each entity of a system is treated and modelled as a process.  A process is used to 
define the behaviour or activities of the parties. A process is defined using the keyword 
proctype, followed by the process‟s name and a set of parameters.  The following table 
is an example of the process: 
  
   proctype Consumer(chan channel_C_M, channel_C_FSP) 
  { 
bool sendM2, send AF-M1; 
 sendM2 = FALSE; 
 sendAF-M1 = FALSE; 
     } 
 
When we have identified the process, we can then instantiate the process by using the 
keyword run.  There are two kinds of variables for the basic data objects: local 
variables, which are defined within the scope of a process, and global variables, which 
are defined outside the scope of a process.  The basic data types used in Promela are: 
bit, byte, bool, and int.  The message channels are used to model the transfer of data 







chan ch = [0] of {bit}; 
 
Communication through message channels can be defined as a synchronous message 
channel, and each message contains one field which is of bit type.  The statement below 
sends a message with the value of C, which is 0, to the channel ch; 
 
bit c = 0 
ch ! c ;  
The statement below obtained a message from channel ch and save the amount in 
changeable m: 
 
ch ? m; 
 
Promela statements are either executable or blocked.  A statement is executable as far 
as it is not blocked, but once it is blocked, it will not be executable.  Print statements 
and assignment statements are always unconditionally executable.  An expression 
statement is executable only if it is non-zero (true).  If the expression value is zero, then 










LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [72] is used by SPIN for describing behavioural the 
properties of a system.  In other words, it checks the model‟s properties to be 
authenticated.  The operators of LTL describe a pattern of the order of events on a 
single computation path [75]; that is, the operators describe a pattern for a sequence of 
events in a set of states of a system.  
The following diagram explains the above statement[4]: 
 
“and” (∧), “or” (∨), “not” (￢), and “implies” (⇒);  





5.3. Modelling the Protocol 
The SPIN model checker is a system that is used to check the fairness Characteristic of 
proposed protocol.  When using the SPIN model checker for the authentication of the 
fairness property of the protocol, a protocol meta-language, Promela, is used to model 
against the specified protocol, and the fairness property specified using LTL.  All the 
participants in the protocol are represented by a process in Promela, and their activities 
are also specified in the process.  The various entities that take part in the protocol are 




5.3.1. Modelling the Customer process 
The Customer as a party in the fair exchange protocol is represented by the Customer 
process.  The process begins as the Customer waits for the message M1 from the 
Merchant process.  All feasible activities of the Customer are listed once message M1 
is obtained (Chapter 5 discusses all feasible activities).  
The possible activities are: M1 is accurate and the Customer wishes to continue the 
exchange; M1 is accurate but the Customer does not wish to continue with the 
exchange; or M1 is wrong but the Customer communicates with the FSP for resolution 
before transmitting M2 to the FSP.  Each and every likely activity of the Customer is 
indicated in the Customer process.  Hence, these activities together with all probable 
activities of the Merchant and the FSP are authenticated by the model checker.  
Similarly, all probable activities of the Customer are identified after transmitting M2, 
obtaining M3, transmitting AF-M1, and obtaining AF-M3. 













   /* Consumer 
Sends messages: M2, send AF-M1 
Receives messages: M1, M3, AF-M3 
 
*/ 
proctype Consumer(chan channel_C_M, channel_C_FSP) 
{ 
 
 bool sendM2, send AF-M1,waitForM1, waitForM3, waitForAF-M3; 
  
 sendM2 = FALSE; 
 sendAF-M1 = FALSE; 
 waitForM1 = FALSE; 
 waitForM3 = FALSE; 
 waitForAF-M3 = FALSE; 
 quitConsumer = TRUE;  
 do 
 :: (waitForM1 == FALSE) -> 
  channel_C_M!M2; 
  sendM2 = TRUE; 
  waitForM1 = TRUE; 
  quitConsumer = FALSE; 





:: (quitMerchant == FALSE && waitForM1 == TRUE &&                                
                       waitForM3 == FALSE) -> 
                        channel_C_M!M1; 
  sendM2 = TRUE; 
  waitForM3 = TRUE; 
  printf("Consumer: M2 sent to Finacial Service Provider \n"); 
  if 
   :: TRUE -> /* Consumer like to go-ahead   */ 
   sendM2 = TRUE; 
   quitConsumer = FALSE; 
   printf("Consumer: Consumer like to go-ahead \n"); 
    
   :: TRUE -> /* Consumer do not want to go-ahead   */ 
   quitConsumer = TRUE; 
   printf("Consumer: Consumer do not want to go-ahead  \n"); 












5.3.2. Modelling the Merchant process 
 
The Merchant as a party in the fair exchange protocol is represented by the Merchant 
process.  The process begins when the Merchant transmits the message M1 to the 
Customer process.  After the message is transmitted, the process then waits for the 
message M2 to be obtained from the FSP process.  Upon obtaining M2, the Merchant 
process will specify all likely situations and activities of the Merchant. 
The diagram below partly illustrates the Merchant process, which indicates transmitting  
message M1 to the Customer process.  
              /* Merchant  
             Sends messages: M1, M3 
          Receives messages: M2, AF-M3  
       */ 
proctype Merchant(chan channel_C_M, channel_M_FSP) 
{ 
 
 bool sendM1, sendM3, waitForM2, waitForAF-M3; 
 
 sendM1 = TRUE; 
 sendM3 = FALSE; 
 waitForM2 = FALSE; 
 waitForAF-M3 = FALSE; 





   
                    :: (sendM1 == TRUE) -> 
  channel_C_M!M1; 
                         sendM1 = TRUE; 
  quitMerchant = FALSE; 
  printf("Merchant: M1 sent to Consumer \n"); 
                            if 
                                  :: channel_C_M?M2 -> 
   waitForM2 = TRUE; 
   printf("Merchant: Recieves the M2 from the FSP  \n"); 
                                       if 
                           :: TRUE -> /* Merchant decided the go-ahead with the purchase  */ 
    quitMerchant = FALSE; 
    channel_C_M!M3; 
    sendM3 = TRUE; 
 printf("Merchant: Merchant decided the go-ahead with the purchase  \n"); 
  :: TRUE -> /* Merchant decided not to go-ahead with the purchase  */ 
    quitMerchant = TRUE; 
  printf("Merchant decided not to go-ahead with the purchase  \n"); 
    break; 
    :: timeout -> 
    quitMerchant = TRUE; 
    printf("Timeout at Merchant \n"); 




5.3.3. Modelling the FSP process 
The FSP ( Financial Service Provider ) process in Promela represents the FSP entity in 
the proposed fair exchange protocol. Only the customer can contact the FSP for 
complaints.  Hence, the FSP model listens for incoming messages from the Customer 
process.  Upon obtaining the message M2 from the Customer process, the FSP process 
transmits the messages to the Merchant process. 
  
     /* Financial Service Provider (FSP) 
               Sends messages: AF-M3 
             Receives messages: M2, AF-M1 
          */ 
proctype FSP(chan channel_M_FSP, channel_C_FSP) 
{ 
 do 
 :: channel_C_FSP?M2 -> 
  channel_M_FSP!M2; 
printf("FSP validates the payment details and send the confirmation to Merchant  \n"); 
  if 
  :: TRUE -> /* Payment is successfuly validated   */ 
  paymentValidatedSuccessful = TRUE; 
  printf("FSP: Payment is successfuly validated"); 
  :: TRUE -> /* Payment couldn't be validated   */ 
  paymentValidatedSuccessful = FALSE; 




5.3.4. Modelling the Fairness property 
Fairness in the protocol can be achieved when both transacting parties acquire each 
other‟s items, or none do so.  For example, if the exchange involves a cell phone, at 
abortion the exchange, the consumer will acquire a cell phone item and the seller will 
acquire a correct money, or neither of them will obtain anything.  This fairness property 
is specified in the LTL formula as follows[4]: 
 
 
□((quit_Merchant ∧ quit_Customer) ⇒ 
◊((receive_CorrectPayment ∧ receive_CorrectProduct) ∨ 
 (￢ receive_CorrectPayment ∧ ￢ receive_CorrectProduct))) 
   
This LTL formula shows that at the end of the protocol the two parties involved in the 
exchange process (the Customer and the Merchant) have exchanged each other‟s items.  
That is, either the Customer has gain the digital product and the seller money, or neither 











5.4. The Verification results 
iSPIN is used to write the protocol‟s specifications in Promela.  Figure 26 below 








iSPIN gives the means for simulating the protocol specified in Promela.  Several 
simulations of the protocol are carried out in order to examine the activities of the 
entities involved in the transaction. 
 
   





This chapter has discussed the formal verification methods for system authentication.  
It has also discussed the protocol modelling and the specification of the fairness 
property.  We have also shown that the SPIN model checker validates the specified 
fairness property against the specified models.  The model or specification is not the 
same as the protocol itself.  This can be caused either by errors in the modelling or by 
failure on the side of the specification of the protocol to fully express the protocol.  The 
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main reasons for failure in the specification include: firstly, the model of the protocol 
usually specifies the protocol in a general or abstract way, and hence, the model will 
not show all the items of the protocol but will only indicate all likely activities that the 
model checker will examine in order to confirm if a property holds.  Secondly, there 
may be some weaknesses in the formal techniques used, which leads to their inability to 
adequately express the protocol.  
The SPIN model checker therefore assists in the formal authentication of the fairness 
property against the specified models.  It also assists in simulating all possible 
situations of the protocol.  Another side, the execution of the protocol (to be discussed 
in the next chapter) is crucial and totally different from the modelling of the protocol.  
This is because protocol execution is mainly concerned with handling real data.  The 
implementation of the protocol will help in dealing with real data (digital commodity 
and payment) and entities (C, M, FSP).  It also deals with whether all entities can make 
and transmit the protocol‟s messages, validates the accuracy of the received messages, 
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In this chapter, we discuss the design and execution of the prototype that 




6.1. High Level Design 
The Java programming language is used to create a prototype to test the concept. The 
architectural design of the system for the protocol is contain of the next entities. 
 FSP Server 











Figure 28: Protocol high level design 
 
In the pre-exchange phase, the merchant server communicates with the FSP server.  
The merchant then encodes the item using a temporary session key that will be used by 
the customer to decode the commodity.  An invoice is then produced for the purchase 
of the commodity. The various entities that take part in the exchange phase are the 
Merchant server, the FSP server and the Customer. During this phase, the protocol 
messages are exchanged between these parties.  The customer communicates with the 
FSP server in case of any complaint during the exchange phase.  The FSP server then 
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confirms the validity of the complaint.  If the complaint is genuine, the FSP initiates an 
automatic resolution for both the Merchant server and the Customer. 
 
6.1.1. Activity diagrams for protocol 
Figures 29 and 31 illustrate all the activities that occur during the exchange phase 
between the Customer, the Merchant server and the FSP server.  Figure 30 illustrates 
the activities of the dispute resolution phase.  The specifications of the protocol in 
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Figure 30: The Merchant server activity diagram. 
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A proof of concept (POC) has been developed to provide the basic flows discussed in 
the proposed protocol.  The POC is intended to display the efficiency and enforcement 
of the proposed protocol in expression of communication cost and speed, and its ability 
to provide enough information for conflict resolution. 
The prototype consists of three modules: 
1- Merchant: this is a Java EE application that is hosted on a Tomcat application 
server.  This module consists of the following major components: 
a. RequestHanlder servlet: this servlet is responsible for handling the 
request of the customer and providing the proper response.  For 
example, when the customer selects a certain product, a customer 
request is stored on the database for further processing.  
b. FSPConnector: this is a servlet that is responsible for communicating 
the customer‟s request to the FSP, sending the details necessary for the 
FSP to proceed with its obligations.  All the communication between the 
FSP and the Merchant takes place using the SOAP over HTTP protocol.  
SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) is the de facto standard used for 
Web services; it is an XML set of communication standards that are 
used for the loosely coupled integration of different systems built using 
different technologies. 
c. Product Delivery Handler: this component is triggered when a payment 
confirmation is received from the FSP.  This component encrypts the 
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product, compresses it and delivers it to the customer via email or 
through the web page, depending on the file size. 
2- FSP is another web application developed using Java EE technology, and it too 
runs on a Tomcat application server.  The main components of this module are: 
a. MerchantHandler: this servlet is responsible for obtaining the payment 
details sent by the Merchant.  
b. CustomerPaymentHandler: this is responsible for providing the 
Customer with the proper interface to obtain the payment details and 
approval to proceed with acquiring the product. 
c. PaymentUpdater: this is a scheduled task that uses Quartz for Java.  
This task monitors any updates on the payment details in order to notify 
the Merchant. 
3- Customer: this is the user of the system, who accesses the system and obtains 
the information over his browser.  connection among the Consumer and the 
seller and the between the Consumer and the FSP takes place over digitally 
signed HTTP post requests 
 
 
6.3. Application Control Panel 
In order to generate real readings that can provide accurate measures of the 
performance of the proposed protocol, a centralized control panel is provided that lists 
all the communications taking place between the three modules.  These communication 
items are recorded together with some necessary information in order to provide a 
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measurement for the performance of the proposed algorithm.  These extra information 
data include the following: 
 Request initiation time  
 Request fulfilment time 
 Time needed to obtain the response to a call (if any) 
 The size of the data being sent over the network 
Besides providing the details of the communication between the different parties, the 
control panel allows for simulating the full cycle of the communication between the 
different modules, independent of the underlying network infrastructure. 
 
 




The simulation of the proposed protocol is implemented using Java SE.  The user 
interface in Figure 32 shows the main flow of the protocol simulation, which is the 
same as the real one.  All the communicated data are encrypted using the Java 
Cryptography APIs. 
In order to derive the most accurate measures for the performance of the protocol 
(using the simulation), no real network communication takes place; instead, the 
network bandwidth (data rate) is simulated as demonstrated in the Figure below.  
Providing the measurement in a controlled environment should give more precise 
results. 
 
Figure 33: Obtaining the time needed for an operation 
 
In this code snippet, the application is forced to wait for a period that is equivalent to the 
period requirement to transfer the data of size (encKey.getBytes().length) over a 
network of data rate that is equal to Util.getRate().  Using a real network 
communication would have resulted in an overhead that would lead to a measurement 
of not only the application logic itself, but also the communication overhead. 
As can also be noticed in the code snippet, the performance is measured using the 
System.nanoTime() API call; this API is documented in Sun‟s Java API docs  
Another option that is available for measuring the time needed to complete an 
operation depends on reading the system‟s millisecond records.  This can be 
143 
 
done in Java using the currentTimeMillis API call, which is documented in Java 
docs as well: 
System.currentTimeMillis returns the „wall clock‟ time of the computer.  The control of 
this is outside the JVM and can change unpredictably, for example, because of periodic 
setting of the system time by an ntp service.  This means that intervals measured using 
System.currentTimeMillis will include any changes to the computer‟s clock. 
The method System.nanoTime was introduced in Java 1.5 to address this problem.  
Whenever an interval is computed (and the JVM is not restarted between start and 
stop), System.nanoTime should be used instead (converting the result to millis as 
needed).  This is why the use of System.nanoTime should provide a more precise result 
in terms of performance measurement. 
 
6.4. Security 
In the implementation of the suggested protocol, securing the messages between the 
different parties (Merchant, Customer and FSP) is of paramount importance, and this is 
why the implementation contains different levels of encryption, as will be detailed 
later. 
The encryption algorithms used in the implementation are done using Java 
Cryptography APIs and Java Cryptography Extension.  The following points detail the 
encryption algorithm used for each message, and the sources and destinations related to 
each message: 
1- Communication between Merchant and FSP: the encryption is done using the 
DES algorithm, and the implementation uses an Asymmetric key, which is 
agreed upon between the Merchant and the FSP prior to starting to exchange 
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data.  For making the implementation straightforward, the key pair is randomly 
created at each application start-up. 
2- Communication between the Merchant and the Customer: this is done using 
DES with the Asymmetric key pair 
3- Product encryption: the product is encrypted using the temporary Asymmetric 
key pair, which is exchanged with the Customer and the FSP.  The key itself is 
encrypted using DES. 
4- Invoice authenticity check: the invoice that is being sent by the Merchant to the 
FSP is stored by the FSP in a message digest format.  Later, when the buyer 
gains the invoice from the seller, he will send it to the FSP for validation. 
 
6.5. User Interface Elements 
 Customer Product Selection 
Using this part of the application, the user is able to enter the product size.  This 
approach is used to enable the easy implementation of the system; instead of focusing 
on boilerplate code, the focus is on implementing the core functionality of the 
implementation. 
 




 Encrypted Product Data 
Once the Customer has entered the desired product (simulated by entering the product 
size), the Merchant generates a random set of data that will resemble the product itself.  
The product is then encrypted using the session key, and the encrypted data are 
displayed in the Merchant panel, which are then sent to the Customer and viewed in the 
Customer panel. 
 




 Product Data 
This panel shows the original product data, which are randomly generated, and to make 
these data more readable, every couple of characters are randomly separated with a 
space. 
 
                         




 Merchant Message Details 
This panel shows the sizes of the generated messages, namely, the product data size, 
the encrypted product data size and the session key size.  The last part of the panel is 
used to simulate real-life messaging, where each request sent to the FSP will contain an 
invoice.  The invoice size can be entered using this field to simulate different invoice 
data sizes. 
                                      
Figure 37: Messaging details 
 
 
 Network Data Rate Settings 
As discussed earlier, having a controlled environment to operate an application for 
measurement can be difficult using real communication media because for various 
reasons.  In order to make the results as accurate as possible, network data rates are 




                      
Figure 38: Setting the network data rate 
 
 Function Analysis 
Every function called during the execution of each operation is detailed in this table.  
The details include the operation (message ID), the initiator, the receiver, the time 
needed to complete the function and the data size in bytes. 
 
                                     











 Application Settings 
 
                                 
Figure 40: Application Settings 
 
 Main Flow Activity Diagrams 
This section demonstrates the three main activities described in the suggested 
algorithm: Customer-Merchant interaction to select the product and start the purchase 
process, and the Customer-FSP-Merchant cycle to fulfil the purchase process. 
 
 
Figure 41: Product request interaction flow 
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When the user selects a product, which in the case of this POC is done by entering a 
product size, the Merchant service receives the Customer‟s request and then randomly 
generates product data matching the selected size.  The Merchant service then creates 
the tsk that will be used after while by the FSP for conflict resolution.  The temporary 
session key, product details and invoice details are sent to the FSP after being 
encrypted using the Merchant‟s secret key.  The FSP service, about to gain the 
encrypted order from the seller, decrypts the message to extract the details; the FSP 
then generates a message digest that is stored at the FSP until completion.  The 
message digest is used by means of the buyer to check that the invoice gained from the 
seller service is authentic.  The FSP service finally sends an ACK to the Merchant 
service, stating that the transaction was successful. 
 
 




Once the ACK is received from the FSP, the Merchant service encrypts the product by 
the sk that was rationed together with the FSP.  The encrypted product, invoice, and 
FSP authentication details are encrypted and sent to the Customer.  The Customer 
verifies that the message gained from the Merchant is creditable by sending the request 
to the FSP service, which checks the request‟s authenticity against the message digest 
that was generated and stored in the previous flow.  If the request is verified, the buyer 
is asked to make a payment for the item.  The FSP then transmits the payment 
confirmation to the seller, who in turn transmit the sk to the buyer to be used to decrypt 
the product. 
Finally, if the Merchant fails to send the session key to the Customer, whether 
deliberately or for technical reasons, the Customer can refer back to the FSP in order to 
obtain what is rightly his.  The flow is detailed in the figure below; the Customer sends 
the invoice number to the FSP, who checks the validity of the request and that the 
payment has been fulfilled.  The FSP then sends a request to the Merchant with the 
invoice number, asking the Merchant to correct the status of the related product request.   
The FSP will then wait for a pre-set timeout and then checks back with the Customer to 
see if the Merchant has sent the session key.  If not, the FSP sends the stored session 
key to the Customer.  The same scenario can be triggered if the Merchant sends an 











6.6. Performance Evaluations 
To measure the performance of the proposed protocol, we performed a emulation of the 
Zhang et al. protocol [43] and the Devane et al. protocol [44], and compared the results 
of each one with our protocol. The purpose of performance evaluations is to measure 
the computation time of each message, and to determine the total computation time. 
The compration Properties are the time for constructing the messages, the time for 








Scenario 1: digital 
product 
size = 28KB 
Scenario 2: digital 
product 
size = 2.2MB 
Pr-M1 Generating temporary session key 14 35 
Pr-M1 Encrypting temporary session key 12 38 
Pr-M1 Sending encrypted temporary 
session key 
23.7 239 
Pr-M1 Sending invoice details 4 4 
Pr-M2 Generating message digest for 
signed invoice 
3 29 
M1 Encrypting product using session 
key 
34 53.6 
M1 Encrypting the product, invoice 
and FSP PK 
20 98 
M1 Sending the product, invoice and 
FSP PK to the customer 
147 537 
M1 Decrypting the Merchant message 47 59 
M2 Validating the invoice received 
from the Customer 
3 3 
M3 Sending the session key to the 
Customer 
61 78 
Total 368.7 1173.6 




Scenario 1: digital 
product 
size = 28KB 
Scenario2:digital 
product 
size = 2.2MB 
Message 1 construction 34 49 
Message 1 verification 24 47 
Message 2 construction 56 406 
Message 2 verification 26.2 67 
Message 3 construction 61.2 94 
Message 4 construction 67 77 
Payment decryption 186.7 211 
Digital product decryption 188.8 671 
Total 643.9 1622 
Table 12: Timing of the Zhang et al. protocol 
 
Table 13: Timing of the Devane et al. Protocol 
ID 
Scenario 1: digital 
product 
size = 28KB 
Scenario 2: digital 
product 
size = 2.2MB 
Message 1 construction 54 67 
Message 1 verification 34 77 
Message 2 construction 65 493 
Message 2 verification 44 78 
Message 3 construction 65 94 
Message 4 construction 67 76 
Payment decryption 193 271 
Digital product decryption 199 701 




The comparison outcome display that the new protocol is more efficacious than either 
the Zhang et al. protocol [43] or the Devane et al. protocol [44]. 
By testing our protocol prototype, our work has proved that the process of the proposed 
protocol is workable. When it is implemented in the real world, the length of the 
asymmetric keys becomes the main factor affecting the protocol‟s performance; in 
other words, increasing the length of the asymmetric keys (to generate the highest 
possible level of security) will increase the computation time significantly. 
 
6.7. Summary 
The design and implementation of the prototype presented in this chapter. Also the 

































 Summary of thesis 
 Measure of Success 







7.1. Summary of Thesis 
Due to the rapid growth of electronic commerce in recent years, many businesses are 
today conducted online.  In other words, more businesses than ever before are using the 
Internet to sell their commodities to people all over the world.  The internet provides 
them with a platform for selling their items to all kinds of people without the 
restrictions of geographical borders.  Customer choice in buying goods and services has 
been greatly improved through this growth in e-commerce, and for a variety of reasons, 
growing numbers of customers now opt to buy their items through the Internet 
[112,113]. Firstly, customers have the convenience of making purchases in the comfort 
of their homes without having to go to shopping malls or having to suffer the hassle of 
traffic jams.  Secondly, customers have the opportunity to quickly compare the prices 
of various traders.  Thirdly, goods and services are delivered to the customer‟s home.  
Lastly, customers are able to buy products at anytime from anywhere in the world.  
Accordingly, there needs to be a system in place for ensuring that all data being sent is 
done so through secure means.  There is no doubt that e-commerce has made the 
exchange of goods and services easier but it also poses risks to both the customer and 
the merchant, including the issues of security, safeguarding users‟ privacy, trust and 
anonymity.  The main challenge lies in the exchange of the digital commodities among 
the Participants ingaged in the operation. This is because,no previous dealing among 
the transacting Participants so they maybe no confidence amont them.  For overcome 
this, the concept of fair exchange has been developed, and this manifested through 




Fair exchange protocols are divided into two: the ones that involve the participation of 
a Trusted Third Party (TTP), and the ones that do not.  The TTP guarantees fair 
exchange of products among the transacting Participants. The protocols do not use 
trusted third party use the idea of submitting the product in parts.  For instance, the 
customer transmits part of the payment while the merchant transmits part of the item.  
The exchange process goes on until the complete item is traded.  
The protocols that use a TTP are containin different kinds: the first is called an inline 
TTP-based protocol.  The role of the TTP is to exchange the respective commodities.  
In other words, each entity submits its product to TTP, and the TTP then delvers the 
digital commodity to the buyer and the payment to the merchant.  In this case, the TTP 
guarantees that fairness is achieved in the protocol [112,113].   
The second type of protocol uses an online TTP.  The role of the online TTP is only to 
verify the items to be exchanged, and hence the participation of the trusted third party 
in this protocol is reduced.  The third kind of protocol is offline .  In these protocols, the 
transacting entities trade each party product directly, and the trusted third party only 
participates to solve problems; hence, its involvement in the protocol is minimized. 
Above, we have discussed the two kinds of fair exchange protocol (those that use a 
TTP and those that do not).  Their main aim is to guarantee the fair exchange of 
products for the transacting parties.  Protocols that do not use a TTP are much less 
effective because the process required to complete them is long; in order to obtain 
fairness for the transacting entities, the protocols should have equal computational 
power.  On the other hand, the major limitation of the inline protocols use the trusted 
third party is that the trusted third party can become the source of a bottleneck but it 
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should always be present.  Also, the protocols cannot submit the products to the 
transacting parties if the TTP crashes [112,113].  
When we compare protocols that use an online TTP and the ones that involve the use of 
an inline TTP, we realise that they both have setbacks.  The difference is that in online 
TTP, the participation of the TTP is greatly reduced.  Generally speaking, in the offline 
protocols, the TTP is not engaged in the protocols unless there is a conflict between the 
transacting parties. 
This thesis has focused on online fair exchange protocols to exchange payments and 
items between customers and merchants.  The work reported in this thesis first studied 
the existing fair exchange protocols that seek to address the fairness problem.  Then, 
we proposed a more efficient protocol to serve this purpose.  The original idea in this 
thesis is to reduce the communication overheads, risks and solve the bottleneck 
problems in the protocols that involve an online TTP.  The idea is to dividing the 
process to two phases, pre exchange phase and exchange phase. The proposed protocol 
has the characteristics: three messages are required between all parties, the protocol 
guarantee strong fairness for both customer and merchant. The new protocol let the 
customer to be sure about the merchant‟s item before he send his item and let the 
merchant to be sure about the customer‟s item before he send his item, online disputes 








7.2. Measure of Success 
The results reported in this thesis began with a set of aims labelled the Measure of 
Success; these were enumerated in Chapter 1. This section addresses each of the 
criteria to ascertain the degree to which the research has been successful. 
The proposed protocol has the following features: only three messages are required to 
be exchanged among all the parties involved; this is the lowest number of messages 
when compared with the other relevant fair exchange protocols in the literature.  With 
regard to the number of messages in the dispute resolution phase, the lowest possible 
number of messages to be executed is three.  Therefore, the number of messages 
exchanged during the proposed protocol (in both the exchange and dispute phases) is 
kept to a minimum. 
The protocol guarantees strong fairness for both customer and merchant.  IT allows 
both parties (customer and merchant) to check the correctness of the item of the other 
party before they send their item; disputes are resolved automatically online by a 
Financial Service Provider (FSP), which is efficient in that it has a low number of 
modular exponentiations. 
The SPIN model checker is the system that was used to verify the fairness of our 
protocol.  When using the SPIN model checker for the authentication of the fairness 
property of the protocol, the fairness property was specified using LTL.  All the 
participants in the protocol are represented by a process in Promela, and their activities 




A proof of concept (POC) was developed to describe the basic flows within the 
proposed protocol.  The POC is intended to show the efficiency and assess the 
performance of the proposed protocol in terms of communication cost and speed, and 
its ability to provide enough information for conflict resolution. 
The comparisons will be made in accordance with a number of different properties; (1) 
How many massages required in every phase?, (2) Is the trusted third party save the 
item?, (3) Which party will arise the dispute?, and (4)compare the modular 
exponentiations numbers  .These different criteria will help improve the protocol by 
reduce the time for send and receive the messages, Reduce the time for generates and 
verify the messages and the use of TTP is only for verifying the items not use for 
















7.4. Future Works 
The proposed e-commerce protocol was completed in the time available.  However, 
some valuable researches remain to be done in the future. 
 
 This researcher plans to modify the protection method for digital contents 
through which the merchant can use different symmetric keys to encrypt a 
specific digital content for different customers.  This modification would 
provide the merchant with a higher degree of security for digital-content 
protection, and would also prevent collusion between customers (in trying to 
obtain the decryption key of a specific digital content). 
 
 Some customers prefer to remain anonymous (with respect to merchants).  The 
protocols presented in this thesis do not offer such anonymity to the customer; 
this is because the merchant can identify the customer from the payment.  
Future work could study how to provide anonymity for customers within the 
proposed protocol. 
 
 Investigate the use of more than one TTP in the protocol. 
 
 The parties involved in the exchange phase of the proposed protocol are C and 
M; i.e. there are two parties.  Future work could extend the ideas of the 




 Besides the RSA-based electronic cash, this researcher intends to consider other 
payment methods (under the customer-anonymity characteristic) to improve the 
computational efficiency of the protocol.  
 
 The protocol presented in this thesis is for the exchange of a payment and a 
items.  Future work could extend this so that our protocol could be used for 
physical products. 
 Existing fault-tolerant techniques from the literature should be combined with 
the proposed protocol in order to generate a fully fault-tolerant fair exchange 
protocol.  This will guarantee fairness for all Participants even in the event of a 
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This appendix includes example of Protocol that is based on an inline 
TTP 
 
Ray et al [33] suggested a fair exchange protocol which is based on the theory of cross 
validation [76]. The cross validation theory therefore allows the customer to verify the 
coded digital product which is expected from the merchant without decrypting it. 
 
This is an inline TTP based protocol that deals with the process of exchanging a digital 
product (held by a merchant) with a payment (held by a customer). The digital products 
of the merchant are advertised in the TTP's catalogue. The following is an explanation 
of the process of advertisement. A key pair K1 (which is for encryption) and K1
-1
 
(which is for decryption) is generated by the merchant; and then the merchant delivers 
them to the TTP, that is the key pair together with the digital product.   
 
The digital product is then coded by the TTP with K1 and then advertised in the 
catalogue of the TTP together with the specifications (the same thing is done for each 
digital product that the merchant wants to exchange for a payment i.e. to sell). Anyone 
who wants to buy digital products  can go online and search the TTP's catalogue and if 
they find any digital products that interest them, then they download from the websit of 
the trusited third party a coded e-item.  
During the execution of this protocol, the transacting parties and the TTP exchange six 
messages. The process of exchange begins with the customer sending the first message 
with a purchase order to the merchant.  The merchant authenticates the first message 
from the customer and if satisfied, then the merchant takes the following steps. Another 
key pairK2 and K2
-1
 that is mathematically related to the first pair is made by the 
merchant (that is sent to the TTP). After that, the seller transfers the second m with the 
signature of the merchant on the purchase order, and K2
-1
 to the TTP.  
The customer then receives from the merchant a third message with the encrypted 
digital product. Upon receiving the third message, the customer makes a comparison of 
the coded digital product that was transmitted by the merchant in the third message 
170 
 
with the coded e-item that was downloaded. If satisfied with the comparison, the 
customer transfer the message number four which contains the purchase order, the 
signature of the customer on the encrypted digital product, and a signed payment to the 
TTP. After getting the fourth message, the TTP makes a comparison of the hash value 
of the purchase order that was sent by the customer  (in the fourth message) with the 
hash value of the purchase order that was sent by the merchant (in the second message).  
 
If the TTP is satisfied with the comparison, it communicates with the customer‟s banks 
for verification of the financial payment. After authenticating the validity of the 
payment, the TTP sends a fifth message and then submits the payment to the merchant 
in the sixth message. The TTP is contacted in case of any disputes.  
 
 In this protocol, it is clear that, despite the delivery of the encrypted digital product by 
the merchant to the customer in the third message (i.e. there is a direct communication 
between the customer and the merchant), there is the involvement of the inline TTP in 
submitting the goods to the concerned entities. Which means the role of the inline TTP 
in this scenario is to submit (1) the decryption key of the encrypted e-item to the buyer 
(encrypted e-item was received from the merchant by the customer in message three), 






















Ray et al[26] proposed an optimistic fair exchange protocol that relies on the notion of 
the theory of cross validation [76]. Before the protocol is initiated, there are some steps 
which are carried out. A merchant  has to enroll with TTP and the TTP then creates the 
key pair. Trusted third party after that gives merchant the KM1 and retains KM1
-1
. On 
the other hand, a buyer should open account in a bank. Then the bank creates the key 
pairs KC1 and KC1
-1
 and then gives C with KC1 and retains KC1
-1. 
 
 The merchant has to transfer the e-item,  specifications and  cost to a Trusted third 
party. The TTP then codes the e-item by utilizing the key KM1 and then the product is 
promoted through advertisement on the Trusted third party‟s website. The buyer then 
goes to the Trusted third party‟s site and downloads the coded digital product. The 
communication between the transacting parties in the Ray et al protocol [26] comprises 
of four messages which have been summed up below. 
 
The first electronic mail which is transmitted by the customer  to the merchant consists 
of (1) the PO and (2) the coded P share the product key of KC1 x KC2. M then confirms 
the authenticity of the first message after getting it and if satisfied then M transmits to 
C the M2 with the e-item which is coded share the item key of KM1 X KM2. After 
receiving the second message, C makes a comparison of the coded digital product from 
the Trusted third party with the coded e-item which was received in the M2 buyer can 
be certain if the two compare well, then the un-coded e-item will be compared as well. 
 
After making the comparison of the two e-item, if buyer is want keen on the exchange 
process then buyer transmits the M3 to seller with the decoding key for the coded 
payment. Lastly, the M4 is transmitted by seller to buyer with the decoding key of the 
coded e-item. In case of any solve problems, buyer should be communicate the Trusted 
third party.. According to this protocol, the Trusted third party.  makes a duplicate for 
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the e-item that seller intends to view. Hence the TTP has to create space for the storage 
of this extra data and also create extra security protection to safeguard the safety of the 





























This appendix includes the Promela code used in SPIN to formally verify the whole 



































#define TRUE 1 






mtype = {M1,M2,M4,M5,M6,M7,M8,M9,M10,M11,M12,M13,M14}; 
 
 
bool quitMerchant, quitConsumer; 
bool paymentValidatedSuccessful, receiveCorrectProduct; 
 
 
/* Merchant  
Sends messages:M1, M4, M6, M10 
Receives messages: M2, M5, M9 
*/ 
proctype Merchant(chan channel_C_M, channel_M_FSP, channel_M_OPR) 
{ 
 
 bool sendM1, sendM4, sendM6, sendM10, waitForM2, waitForM5, waitForM9; 
 
 sendM1 = FALSE; 
  
 sendM4 = FALSE; 
 sendM6 = FALSE; 
 sendM10 = FALSE; 
 waitForM2 = FALSE; 
 waitForM5 = FALSE; 
 waitForM9 = FALSE; 




  :: (sendM1 == FALSE) -> 
  channel_C_M!M1; 
  sendM1 = TRUE; 
  quitMerchant = FALSE; 
  printf("Merchant: M1 sent to Consumer \n"); 
 
  if 
 
   :: channel_C_M?M2 -> 
   waitForM2 = TRUE; 
   printf("Merchant: Recieves the M2 from the Consumer  \n"); 
 




    :: TRUE -> /* Merchant decided the go-ahead with the 
purchase  */ 
    quitMerchant = FALSE; 
    channel_C_M!M4; 
    sendM4 = TRUE; 
    printf("Merchant: Merchant decided the go-ahead with 
the purchase  \n"); 
     
    :: TRUE -> /* Merchant decided not to go-ahead with the 
purchase  */ 
    quitMerchant = TRUE; 
    printf("Merchant decided not to go-ahead with the 
purchase  \n"); 
    break; 
     
    :: timeout -> 
    quitMerchant = TRUE; 
    printf("Timeout at Merchant \n"); 
    break; 
 
   fi 
 
  fi 
   
  :: (sendM1 == TRUE && sendM4 == TRUE) -> 
  waitForM5 = TRUE; 
  channel_M_FSP?M5; 
  quitMerchant = FALSE; 
  printf("Merchant: Received the confirmation from the regulator  \n"); 
   
  :: (waitForM5 == TRUE) -> 
  sendM6 = TRUE; 
  channel_C_M!M6; 
  quitMerchant = FALSE; 
  printf("Merchant: Sending the Invoice to the Consumer  \n"); 
   
   
  :: (sendM6 == TRUE && sendM10 == FALSE) -> 
   
  if 
   :: channel_M_FSP?M9 -> 
   
   if 
    :: (paymentValidatedSuccessful == TRUE) -> 
    quitMerchant = FALSE; 
    waitForM9 = TRUE; 
    sendM10 = TRUE; 
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    channel_C_M!M10; 
    printf("Merchant: Sending the product the consumer  
\n"); 
     
    :: (paymentValidatedSuccessful == FALSE) -> 
    quitMerchant = TRUE; 
    waitForM9 = TRUE;  
    channel_C_M!M10; 
    sendM10 = TRUE; 
    printf("Merchant: Quit since the payment is unseccesful. 
Inform the consumer  \n"); 
    break; 
     
    ::TRUE -> 
    quitMerchant = TRUE; 
    waitForM9 = TRUE; 
    channel_C_M!M10; 
    sendM10 = TRUE; 
    printf("Merchant: Quit since the payment is not done. 
Inform the consumer  \n"); 
    break; 
    
   fi 
   
  fi 
   









Sends messages: M2, M7, M12 
Receives messages: M1, M6, M8, M10, M14 
 
*/ 
proctype Consumer(chan channel_C_M, channel_C_FSP, channel_C_OPR) 
{ 
 
 bool sendM2, sendM7, sendM12, waitForM1, waitForM6, waitForM8, 
waitForM10; 
  
 sendM2 = FALSE; 
 sendM7 = FALSE; 
 sendM12 = FALSE; 
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 waitForM1 = FALSE; 
 waitForM6 = FALSE; 
 waitForM8 = FALSE; 
 waitForM10 = FALSE; 




  :: (waitForM1 == FALSE) -> 
  channel_C_M!M2; 
  sendM2 = TRUE; 
  waitForM1 = TRUE; 
  quitConsumer = FALSE; 
  printf("Consumer: M2 sent to Merchant \n"); 
   
   
  :: (quitMerchant == FALSE && waitForM1 == TRUE && waitForM6 
== FALSE) -> 
  channel_C_M!M6; 
  sendM7 = TRUE; 
  waitForM6 = TRUE; 
  printf("Consumer: M7 sent to Finacial Service Provider \n"); 
   
  if 
   
   :: TRUE -> /* Consumer like to go-ahead with the payment  */ 
   sendM7 = TRUE; 
   quitConsumer = FALSE; 
   printf("Consumer: Consumer like to go-ahead with the payment 
\n"); 
    
   :: TRUE -> /* Consumer do not want to go-ahead with the 
payment  */ 
   quitConsumer = TRUE; 
   printf("Consumer: Consumer do not want to go-ahead with the 
payment \n"); 
   break; 
   
  fi 
   
  :: (quitMerchant == FALSE && waitForM1 == TRUE && sendM7 == 
TRUE && waitForM8 == FALSE ) -> 
  if 
   :: (paymentValidatedSuccessful == TRUE) -> 
   channel_C_FSP?M8; 
   quitConsumer = FALSE; 




    
   :: (paymentValidatedSuccessful == FALSE) -> 
   channel_C_FSP?M8; 
   quitConsumer = TRUE; 
   printf("Consumer: Quit since the payment is unseccesful  \n"); 
   break; 
    
   
  fi 
   
  :: (quitConsumer == FALSE && waitForM1 == TRUE && sendM7 == 
TRUE && waitForM6 == TRUE && waitForM8 == TRUE && waitForM10 == 
FALSE ) -> 
  channel_C_M?M10; 
  waitForM10 == TRUE; 
    
  if 
   
   :: TRUE -> /* Consumer is not happy with the product  */ 
   sendM12 = TRUE; 
   channel_C_OPR!M12; 
   receiveCorrectProduct = FALSE; 
   printf("Consumer: Is not happy with the product \n"); 
    
   :: TRUE -> /* Consumer is happy with the product  */ 
   receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
   quitConsumer = TRUE; 
   printf("Consumer: Happy with the product \n"); 
   break; 
   







/* Financial Service Provider 
Sends messages: M7 












  :: channel_C_FSP?M7 -> 
  channel_C_FSP!M8; 
  channel_M_FSP!M9; 
  printf("Finacial Service Provider validates the payment details and send 
the confirmation to Merchant and Consumer \n"); 
   
  if 
   
  :: TRUE -> /* Payment is successfuly validated   */ 
  paymentValidatedSuccessful = TRUE; 
  printf("Finacial Service Provider: Payment is successfuly validated"); 
   
   
  :: TRUE -> /* Payment couldn't be validated   */ 
  paymentValidatedSuccessful = FALSE; 
  printf("Finacial Service Provider: Payment couldn't be validated"); 
   
  fi 
  





/* Online Purchas eProvider 
Sends messages: M13, M14 










  :: channel_C_OPR?M12 -> 
  printf("Consumer contacts the Online Purchase Provider since merchant 
has not sent the product \n"); 
   
  if 
   
  :: TRUE -> /* If user details are validated with the message   */ 
  paymentValidatedSuccessful = TRUE; 
  printf("Online Purchase Provider: Sending the product to the 
Consumer"); 
  channel_M_OPR!M13; 
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  channel_C_OPR!M14; 
   
   
  :: TRUE -> /* If the user details are not validated with the message   */ 
  printf("Online Purchase Provider: Invaild product/merchant 
information"); 
  channel_C_OPR!M14; 
  break; 
   
  fi 
  











chan channel_C_M = [0] of {mtype}; 
chan channel_C_FSP = [0] of {mtype}; 
chan channel_M_FSP = [0] of {mtype}; 
chan channel_C_OPR = [0] of {mtype}; 
chan channel_M_OPR = [0] of {mtype}; 
 
run Merchant(channel_C_M, channel_M_FSP, channel_M_OPR); 
run Consumer(channel_C_M, channel_C_FSP, channel_C_OPR); 
run FinancialServiceProvider(channel_M_FSP, channel_C_FSP); 
run OnlinePurchaseProvider(channel_M_OPR, channel_C_OPR); 
 
 
} 
 
